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The Durability of Private Claims to
Public Property
BRUCE R. HUBER*
Property rights and resource use are closely related. Scholarly inquiry about
their relation, however tends to emphasize private property arrangements while
ignoring public property-property formally owned by government. The well-
known tragedies of the commons and anticommons, for example, are generally
analyzed with reference to the optimal form and degree of private ownership.
But what about property owned by the state? The federal government alone
owns nearly one-third of the land area of the United States. One could well ask:
is there a tragedy associated with public property, too?
If there is, here is what it might look like: private claims to public property
are remarkably durable. Consider private claims to the lands and resources
owned and managed by the federal government. Once established, these
claims-of which there are hundreds of thousands-seem, in many instances, to
take on a life of their own. Mining claims, leases for the development of coal or
oil and gas, grazing permits, hydropower licenses, ski resort leases, even
residential leases-claims such as these are often extended, expanded, renewed,
and protected by law and by bureaucratic practices in ways that shape, and
often trump, other policy objectives with respect to federal land. Newer claim-
ants, and policies that would favor new land uses or alter the mix of uses, tend
to be disfavored. These tendencies create a set of managerial and policymaking
difficulties that constrain lawmakers and land managers and that ultimately
disserve the interests of the citizens in whose interest state property ostensibly is
managed.
This Article examines the durability of private claims to public property, first,
by providing a set of examples, and second, by explaining how the American
historical experience and legal system combine to give public property this
character Third, it suggests implications for both theory and practice, in
particular cautioning that lawmakers should take into account the phenomenon
described here before granting new forms of access to various public resources.
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The strength, structure, and allocation of property rights in land and natural
resources affect, sometimes profoundly, whether and how those resources will
be used.' For example, a great deal of property scholarship in recent decades
has been animated by "the tragedy of the commons"-the idea that open-access
resources will inevitably be destroyed by overuse.2 Others have described,
conversely, the so-called anticommons tragedy that arises when property is
1. See generally DANIEL H. CoLE, PoLLUTION AND PROPERTY: COMPARING OWNERSHIP INSTITUTIONS FOR
ENvIRONMENrA PRonicIoN (2002) (analyzing the relationship between property regimes and environmen-
tal policy); PROPERTY AND THE LAW IN ENERGY AN!) NATURAL RESOURCES (Aileen McHarg et al. eds., 2010)
(collecting articles describing theoretical and practical effects of various property regimes on natural
resource utilization).
2. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Com-
mon Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. I (1991) (examining resource management strategies within a
commons framework). The label was made famous by Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons,
162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243 (1968). Some of the most important developments are those of Nobel Prize
recipient Elinor Ostrom. See generally ELINOR OsTRom, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE AcTIoN (1990) (exploring alternative theoretical models of the commons
and examining case studies of different approaches to pooled community resources).
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fragmented to a degree that impedes its efficient use. The problems of the
commons and anticommons tend to be framed primarily with respect to private
property: commons problems arise when there is too little of it, roughly
speaking, while anticommons problems arise when there is too much.4 The
trick, it would seem, is to find the golden mean-or, better, to match ownership
institutions with resources in a way that optimally balances private and public
interests in natural resources.
But those concerned with ownership and its relation to resource use might
well ask: what about public property-property formally owned by the state?6
There is an abundance of such property. Our federal government alone owns
nearly one-third of the land area of the United States, and it is land that is
disproportionately rich in a host of natural resources and that encompasses
unique and fragile ecosystems.7 Yet this category of property has been some-
what neglected amidst scholarly fascination with privatization.8 Is there a
"tragedy" associated with public property, too?
3. The seminal work is Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, Ill HARv. L. REv. 621 (1998); see also MICHAEL HELLER, THE
GRIDLOCK ECONOMY- How Too MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, SToPs INNOvWnON, AND COSTS LivEs
xiv, 1-22 (2008) (arguing that too many owners and strong private-ownership rights create societal
gridlock).
4. See Michael A. Heller, Three Faces of Private Property, 79 OR. L. REv. 417, 423 (2000) (seeking
"to explain why too much private property can be as costly as too little"); cf Richard A. Epstein,
Heller's Gridlock Economy in Perspective: Why There is Too Little, Not Too Much Private Property,
53 ARIz. L. REv. 51, 51 (2011) (the title says it all).
5. See COLE, supra note 1, at 178 ("The notion that a single, sociolegal institution-private
property-is both necessary and sufficient to resolve all environmental problems is not just highly
improbable but fantastic. . . . What is required, instead, is a pragmatic, case-by-case approach with a
large toolbox."). See generally PROPERTY IN LAND AND OTHER RESOURCES (Daniel H. Cole & Elinor
Ostrom eds., 2012) (collecting articles on property-rights systems for various resources).
6. By "the state" I mean government generally, and throughout this Article, I use the term "state
property" to refer to property that is owned by any level of government, whether federal, state, or local.
7. See generally PuNI. LAND LAw REvIEw CoMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND: A REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT ANI) TO THE CONGRESS BY THE PUBLIC LAND LAw REVIEW COMMISSION (1970). Though dated, this
encyclopedic work remains a useful source of data about the public lands, as well as an historical report
card on their condition on the eve of the modern environmental movement.
8. See Heller, supra note 4, at 420-21 (arguing that property theorists today have reduced the
conventional trilogy of property forms-private, commons, and state-to a dichotomy between private
and commons property, such that "all theoretical work takes place in the interplay of these two
regimes"); Dean Lueck & Thomas J. Miceli, Property Law, in I HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 183,
196-98 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (noting that state property has not been
"systematically analyzed" and describing the applicable literature as "limited"). Even Harold Demsetz's
pioneering work on the origins of property rights largely ignored state property. See Harold Demsetz,
Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcON. REV. 347, 354 (1967) ("I shall not examine in detail
the alternative of state ownership.").
To be sure, one could never say that the state itself has been forgotten by property scholars, who have
always envisioned a sizeable role for government in the definition and enforcement of property rights,
the regulation of private property, and the regulation of access to commons. Relatively little compara-
tive analysis, however, has examined systematically the character of state-property ownership or given
much consideration to property theory in light of widespread governmental ownership.
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If there is, here is what it might look like, at least in the United States.9
Where public property is made available for private use-and the lion's share of
such land is'o-the legal and regulatory regimes that govern the use of that
property tend to protect existing use claims to a striking degree. Private claims
to state-owned resources, in other words, are remarkably durable. Newer claim-
ants, and policies that would favor new land uses or alter the mix of uses, tend
to be disfavored. These tendencies create a set of managerial and policymaking
difficulties that constrain lawmakers and land managers and ultimately disserve
the interests of the citizens in whose interest state property ostensibly is
managed.
This Article explores this cluster of phenomena within an important, if not the
most important, subset of the category of public property: the land and natural
resources owned by the United States." Federal law has long allowed private
parties to make commercial use of publicly owned natural resources. The
federal public lands of the western United States, for example, have supported
profitable enterprises in mining, ranching, energy and water resource develop-
ment, fisheries, recreation, and much else. When federal lawmakers seek to
change resource policy-for example, to shift from resource development
towards resource conservation, or to address environmental concerns or climate
change-they must decide how to deal with existing users of the public lands.
In many instances, a coherent policy transition would seem to require the
termination, phaseout, or relocation of land uses inconsistent with new policy
goals. In actuality, however, existing land-use patterns on federal lands have
proven to be surprisingly durable. Once established, private claims to public
lands-of which there are hundreds of thousands-seem, in many instances,
to take on a life of their own. Mining claims, leases for the development of coal
or oil and gas, grazing permits, hydropower licenses, ski resort leases, even
residential leases: claims such as these are often extended, expanded, renewed,
and protected by law and by agency managerial practices in ways that shape,
9. The policymaking environment of the United States is unique in the way that it marries a frag-
mented legal system and a political culture wary of centralized power to broad demands for governmen-
tal activism. See generally Rontixr A. KACAN, Avi)VRSARIAi LiUAI.ISM: TM AMFRICAN WAY ou LAw
(2001). Whether the argument developed here is applicable to other legal systems, I must leave for
others to discern.
10. With respect to federally managed lands, which are the primary subject of this Article, various
land units have been withdrawn from certain uses over the years, but nearly all remain open to some
form of private use. See infra Part 1.
I1. Although public property also includes the property of state and local governments (as well as
federal buildings, capital equipment, and a great deal else), certainly for purposes of evaluating
resource utilization, the federal public lands are far and away the most important subset of public
property. The public lands include over 650 million acres: more than 193 million acres of national
forests, 80 million acres of national parks and other lands managed by the National Park Service.
92 million acres of wildlife refuges, as well as over 250 million acres of land and mineral estates
managed by the Bureau of Land Management. GEioRGEl CAMERON CoKotNs .r A.., FlimiRAL. Puntic LAND
AN) RtisouRctis LAw 20-29 (6th ed. 2007). For purposes of this paper, I also include the Outer
Continental Shelf. See Robin Kundis Craig. Treating Offshore Submerged Lands as Public Lands: A
Historical Perspective, 34 Puu. LAND & RaisoucCEs L. Raiv. 51, 51 (2013).
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and often trump, other policy objectives with respect to federal land.12
By "durable," I mean more than simply "of long duration." Many private
rights to public property are quite long-lasting-such as permits to build dams
on federal land, which may be issued for a term of fifty years"-but that
fact alone does not make them durable under my definition.14 The concept of
durability implies something more: it suggests resilience and robustness in the
face of strain or pressure or opposition. Thus, in speaking of the durability of
private claims, I refer to claims that may, as a matter of law, be terminated or
limited or allowed to expire, yet are not terminated or limited or allowed to
expire-despite circumstances that would seem to suggest that the survival of
such claims is contrary to prevailing public policy.'
One might suspect that this durability is the consequence of legal protections
for private property rights, and indeed, such protections are undeniably relevant.
But this Article is principally concerned with claims that fall short of full-
fledged property rights.' 6 Public land law creates land-use rights of varying
legal resilience-some land uses are protected by vested property rights; others
are creatures of contract; and still other uses are simply permissive and termi-
12. See infra Part 1.
13. 16 U.S.C. §799 (2012).
14. Longevity alone is generally not problematic and in fact may be desirable or even necessary for
particular uses. Private entities are understandably reluctant to invest significant capital without some
assurance that such investments rest on steady legal ground for a period long enough to recapture those
investments and generate a return. For example, power companies in the early 1900s insisted on the
long-term security of their access to public lands and waters before investing the millions of dollars
necessary to construct hydropower generation facilities. Even a fifty-year term for permits was not
immediately satisfactory to the power companies. See SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE Goswli. or
EviCIEiNCY: THE PRomI;SSIvIE CONSERVATION MOvEMENT, 1890-1920, at 80-81 (1959).
In fact, in other contexts, it is precisely the lack of long-lasting private rights that creates a policy
problem. In conditions of policy instability, investment risk increases and private investment tends to
decrease as a consequence. Thus, in many instances, the pressing question is how to create a stable,
durable policy environment for private enterprise. See generally ERIC M. PATASHNIK, Ri;IORMS AT RISK:
WHAT HArIPENS AI-rR MAJOR PoLIcy CHANi;s ARE ENACTnED (2008) (analyzing the conditions that allow
policy reforms to "stick"); Ann E. Carlson & Robert W. Fri, Designing a Durable Energy Policy,
142 J. Am. ACA. ARTS & Sci. 119 (2013) (examining durability considerations in the policy choice
between a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade system).
15. Of course, in any given instance, lawmakers or administrators may allow a private claim to
continue because they believe such a decision to be good public policy, or because it is a political
accommodation necessary to the accomplishment of a broader objective. In such cases the "stickiness"
of the private claim is not contrary to public policy, but rather an essential part of it. But even if the
durability of any particular claim appears justified, this Article establishes that private claims exceed
their original parameters in a broad array of legal and factual circumstances, in the hopes of demonstrat-
ing the existence of a widespread and systematic phenomenon that bears examination even if any
particular instance is unremarkable.
16. At risk of stating the obvious, private property has ceased to be public property-although this
distinction is both blurrier and more complex than one might expect. See, e.g., ERIC T. FRI:YROIlIO ,
AGRARIANISM AND THE Goon SocnTy 93-95 (2007) (arguing that private and public control over land is
"a matter of degree" irrespective of private or public ownership). Of course, the durability of private
property is unsurprising given the legal and moral force of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution.
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nable at any time"-yet even weak or limited entitlements often remain intact
much longer than would seem appropriate according to the letter of the law.
Whatever the legal basis of their access to public resources, existing users of
land have been extraordinarily successful in persuading federal land managers
and policymakers to allow their uses to continue, even in spite of facially in-
compatible policy changes. Indeed, longstanding private claims constrain policy
change--or, to be more precise, their existence makes it likely that legislative
and administrative decision-making processes will bend in their favor and away
from changes that might disfavor existing land uses.' 8
There are other consequences associated with the durability of private claims
to public property.1 9 Plainly, questions of fairness and propriety arise to the
extent that federal policy affords preferential treatment to certain claimants to
public resources. Furthermore, when such claims are sustained by undue admin-
istrative lenience or the underenforcement of existing law,20 the possibility of
coherent resource policy is diminished, the task of resource management is
complicated, and federal agencies face reputational damage. Even occasional
departures from legal requirements may not only establish undesirable prec-
edents for subsequent managers, but also create uncertainty for private claim-
ants themselves. More broadly, federal lenience acts as an implicit subsidy for
business entities conducting activities on public-as opposed to private-land,
possibly distorting market signals that would otherwise serve to constrain and
regulate commercial activity.
Why are private claims to state-owned resources so durable? The "stickiness"
of existing claims is in part attributable to the solicitude historically afforded to
traditional extractive industries by natural resources law.2 ' Especially during the
nineteenth century, Congress incentivized settlement and resource development
on the public lands by keeping them open to access and guaranteeing claimants
a degree of long-term stability. For example, the General Mining Law of 1872
(still in effect) not only makes unreserved federal lands open to prospecting, but
17. For a classification of private interests on public lands, see Jan G. Laitos & Richard A. Westfall,
Government Interference with Private Interests in Public Resources, II HARv. ENvTI.. L. REv. 1, 9-19
(1987).
18. And even when change occurs, provision is generally made for existing uses. See COGGINS ET AL.,
supra note II, at 343 (noting that statutes making land policy changes often create exceptions for "valid
existing rights"-language that is "extremely handy and is exceedingly common in federal law"). This
mirrors the typical local government land-use regulatory environment. See Christopher Serkin, Existing
Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1222, 1223-24 (2009).
19. See infra Part Ill.
20. This includes circumstances in which claims are renewed without the satisfaction of legal
requirements for renewal or are not actually terminated upon expiration.
21. See infra Part II. Throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century, the law
of public natural resources facilitated resource extraction with very few limitations. The modern trend
has been towards greater protection of environmental values, but natural resources law is still domi-
nated by what Charles Wilkinson has called the "lords of yesterday"-nineteenth century laws and
norms that are increasingly outmoded, yet enduring. See CHARLEs F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT
MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FuTuRE OF THE WEST 17 (1992).
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also grants prospectors a property interest in their mining claims upon discovery
of valuable minerals-a property interest which may be sustained almost indefi-
nitely. 22 The principal objective of early public land policy was the settlement
and development of the western frontier, and privatization of the public domain
was regarded as necessary to the accomplishment of this goal. Indeed, long-
term federal ownership of vast areas of land was unthinkable until the early part
of the twentieth century and even then was only made politically acceptable by
creating broad private rights of access to federal resources.
This historic model of public land management-we may call it the "open-
access model"-is still evident even today; many would argue that most public
lands ought to be held open for use by citizens with a minimum of government
interference. Yet modem reforms to public land and resource law often reflect a
different model-a "proprietary model"-in which the public interest in federal
land is given effect not by offering open access, but by securing fair compensa-
tion for public resources extracted by private enterprise.2 3 In this view, the
federal land management agencies are conceptualized as trustees or asset manag-
ers whose stewardship of the public lands is compromised when private entities
capture rents in land transactions. As one can easily imagine, it is this vision of
public land ownership that is most acutely at odds with the untoward expansion
and extension of private claims.
Despite its prominence in reform legislation, the proprietary model has been
implemented only haltingly. So although legislators have gone some distance
towards demanding fair market value for private uses of public lands, the actual
boundaries (both temporal and physical) of private claims are defined by
administrative practice. Though most conventional private property rights are
22. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (2012). Until quite recently, mining claims could be patented, passing fee title to
the claimant. Since the early 1990s, however, Congress has imposed a de facto moratorium on the
issuance of additional patents. MARC HUMPHRIES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33908, MINING ON FEDERAL
LANDS: HARDROCK MINERALS 3 (2008). Nonetheless, the 140-year-old statute has given rise to millions
of mining claims over the years. Most claims remain unpatented, leaving paramount title with the
federal government. Id. By the 1960s, the accumulation of mining claims had created such serious
difficulties for federal land managers that Congress approved a recording process intended to clear
away abandoned claims. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006).
Implementation of the law successfully culled the over 6 million unpatented mining claims down to just
over 300,000. See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 86-89 (1985) (describing the background of the
Act and upholding several of its provisions related to forfeiture of abandoned mining claims); JOHN D.
LESHY, THE MINING LAw: A STuDy IN PERPErUAL MOTION 264-65 (1987). Today, in order to preserve a
mining claim, a claimant must pay an annual fee and complete certain paperwork. See 43 C.F.R. § 3861
(2012) (describing paperwork requirements).
With respect to the durability of mining rights, what is perhaps most noteworthy is the remarkable
durability of the legal regime itself-a regime that creates generous private entitlements to federal lands
while nonetheless retaining paramount title for the federal government, at least as regards unpatented
claims. See WILKINSON, supra note 21, at 28-74 (discussing in detail the endurance of the Mining Law
in the face of opposing trends).
23. See infra section II.B. To be clear, the ideas of open access and proprietorship do not remotely
capture all of the many objectives of public land management. Conservation, for example, is a crucial
objective that is somewhat tangent to the distinction I have made, which focuses principally on the
manner of the public's access to and use of public lands.
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cabined by adjacent rights, claims to public resources generally must be con-
fined and contained, if at all, by a federal administrator. Yet historically, the
federal government has had a difficult time enforcing public land laws, if only
because the public lands are so expansive. Thus, many private claims endure
even though their survival violates governing law or applicable regulations. 2 4
Moreover, in those instances in which Congress has given broad discretion to
land management agencies, officials often have little reason to disrupt estab-
lished permissive uses, and they have local, visible, and immediate reasons not
to disrupt them. Such uses are generally given a great deal of deference even
when sustaining these uses appears contrary to broader policy developments
and when termination would be well within the bounds of agency authority.25 It
bears mention that Congress has a long history of ratifying what had previously
been unlawful encroachment on federal land, so private claimants are perhaps
not unwise to imagine that even claims of dubious merit might one day ripen
into lawful possession.2 6
The historical and institutional causes just described suggest that the attri-
butes of public property are not random but systemic. Durable and long-lived
private claims to public property, far from being anomalous, are likely to
characterize such property in the United States for some time to come. Several
implications follow from this. First, as regards theories of property, the ten-
dency of private claims on public property to expand beyond their initial
parameters may go some distance towards explaining the degree of public land
ownership in the United States. That the federal government owns such a
sizable fraction of American land is, to some, an irony of the first order in a
country in which private rights of property and individual economic rights are
so lionized and in which public ownership and socialism so commonly reviled.
It has been assumed that businesses dependent on natural resources would
prefer that such resources were entirely in private ownership, but durable
private access to state-owned resources may be preferable to outright private
ownership to many commercial actors. Indeed, there is some evidence that, at
crucial moments in the development of modem natural resource policy, indus-
trialists joined with conservationists in calling for just such a regime.
Next, this Article adds a new strand to the decades-old dialog about the role
of public property in environmental protection. Environmentalists and conserva-
24. Even today, it is a herculean task to monitor the many activities-legal and illegal-that take
place on public lands. See, e.g., Warren Eth, Note, Up In Smoke: Wholesale Marijuana Cultivation
Within the National Parks and Forests, and the Accompanying Extensive Environmental Damage, 16
PENN ST. ENVTL. L. Rv. 451 (2008); Felicity Barringer, Marijuana Crops in California Threaten
Forests and Wildlife, N.Y. TimEs, June 21, 2013, at A l; see also JOHN ISl, OUR NATioNAL PARK Poi.icy- A
CRITICAl. HISTORY 112 (1961) (noting the staying power of illegal occdpants of national park land).
25. More generally, industry incumbents are regularly protected in times of policy change. See
Bruce R. Huber, Transition Policy in Environental Law, 35 HARv. ENvn.. L. Rtiv. 91, 95-107 (2011)
(describing the pervasiveness of transition relief in environmental law).
26. See infra section II.A.
27. See infra section II.B.
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tionists generally favor public over private ownership-at least with respect to
the historic public lands 2 8 -yet seldom explore the character of publicly owned
lands from a systemic perspective. It may well be true that public land owner-
ship, on balance, better secures a certain set of environmental policy objectives,
but state property may be more susceptible to private influence and control than
previously appreciated and, perhaps more importantly, may be more resistant to
land-use reform.
Finally, if the durability phenomenon described here is a systemic effect that
derives from American history and the structure of American political institu-
tions, then policymakers would, at times, do better to design around this
pathology than to attempt to cure it-for example, by thinking twice before
creating new forms or categories of private claims to public resources. Recent
years have seen many efforts to create new private markets for natural resources
and new modes of private access to public property. Renewable energy produc-
tion on federal lands, for example, is on the rise, as are emissions-trading
programs based on tradable private emissions entitlements. Although environmen-
talists tend to support such programs at present, care should be taken lest
entitlements outgrow their initial purposes. At a minimum, lawmakers should
redouble their efforts to delimit carefully those claims, or "hardwire" limitations
directly into them, lest they give rise to the same difficulties already apparent
elsewhere in public resource management.
This Article will proceed as follows. Part I develops the descriptive premise
of this Article-that private claims to state property are remarkably durable.
Part II discusses the historical and institutional roots of this phenomenon, and
Part III suggests the implications of the preceding analysis, including implica-
tions for current resource policy.
I. THE DURABILITY OF PRIVATE CLAIMS TO PUBLIC PROPERTY
Let us begin with a very brief overview of federal land ownership and the
sorts of private claims that may be asserted on public lands. 30 The federal
government has owned a great deal of land since almost the nation's founding."
But for many years, the central goal of federal land policy was disposal: placing
land into the hands of private landowners for purposes of settlement and
28. For enduring academic arguments along these lines, see, for example, Paul W. Gates, The
Federal Lands-Why We Retained Them, in RETHINKING THE Flil)IRAL LANIs 35 (Sterling Brubaker ed.,
1984), and Joseph L. Sax, The Clai nfor Retention of the Public Lands, in R:THINKING THE FlipmkAL
LANDs, supra, at 125.
29. Some have noted that public and private ownership may not be as distinct as commonly thought.
See, e.g., FRElYRIlIE, supra note 16; Sax, supra note 28, at 128-29 ("stating that ownership. .. is, in
fact, a poor measure of the real relationship that exists between government control and private market
decision making on the public lands"). It is certainly true that, over the course of roughly the last
century, government's regulatory authority over private land-use decisions has expanded enormously.
Yet private and public landowners behave differently, and one objective of this Article is to illuminate
some of these differences.
30. See generally C(KalNs ET AL., supra note II (providing an overview of applicable law).
31. The history of federal land ownership will be recounted in greater detail in section IIA, infra.
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national expansion. Active land management would have required a bureau-
cratic capacity not then enjoyed by the federal government.32 Towards the end
of the nineteenth century, however, federal policy shifted towards land retention
and management in response to emerging ideas and concerns about resource
scarcity, land fraud, and efficient resource management.3 3 By the mid-to-late
twentieth century, Congress had created, piecemeal, an enormous administrative
infrastructure to oversee the roughly 650 million acres of public lands. Since
1976, federal law has more or less explicitly required the retention of this land
by terminating the legal mechanisms by which private individuals had been able
to acquire it.34
The public lands have been classified and divided among various agencies;
there are national parks and monuments, national forests, wildlife refuges,
military training areas, and so forth, under the care of specialized agencies
such as the National Park Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service. The
"leftover" lands-those not earlier reserved for some particular purpose-are
managed by the Bureau of Land Management, which manages more acreage
than any other federal agency.35 Private entities are allowed to use nearly all
federal land in various ways that depend on the land's classification. National
parks are typically devoted almost entirely to recreational purposes; within
national forests, by contrast, hiking, hunting, and other recreational activities
coexist with timber harvesting, hardrock mining, commercial livestock grazing,
32. Until the early 1900s, Congress neither required such management nor provided resources to
build the necessary capacity. During this time, the primary administrative institutions associated with
the federal public lands were the General Land Office and, later, the various land surveys. See generally
PAut. W. GATis, HISTORY oF Puni.ic LAND LAw Divuil.OIrMINT (1968) (providing a comprehensive legal
history of public land law).
33. This is the classic account, as presented by, for example, Roy M. RoBImNs, OUR LANDID
HiERITAGE-: THi PUBic DOMAIN 1776-1936, at 301-426 (1942). An important corrective is found in
Leigh Raymond & Sally K. Fairfax, Fragmentation of Public Domain Law and Policy: An Alternative
to the "Shift-to-Retention" Thesis, 39 NAT. RaisoURCEis J. 649 (1999), which focuses instead on the
fragmentation of federal land policies.
34. The last disposal laws were abrogated by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785). Of course,
Congress can and does still authorize land sales or swaps, but such transactions involve a miniscule
fraction of the total acreage in federal ownership. See generally CARol. HARDY VINCENT lT AL., CONG.
RESEARCH SiiRv., RL 34273, FiDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: CURRENT AcQuisITION ANi) Disposm. AUTHORITIES
(2012) (outlining the current authorities governing the acquisition and disposal of public land).
35. See generally JAMES R. SKIi.IEN, THE NATION'S LAROEST LANDLORD: THu BUREAU OF LAND
MANAGEMENT IN THi AMERICAN WEST (2009) (providing a comprehensive history of the Bureau of Land
Management).
36. Some lands-such as those set apart for military purposes and the like-are not available for any
form of public use. Historically, however, unrestricted private access to public land was the norm. The
Supreme Court in 1890 stated:
We are of [the] opinion that there is an implied license, growing out of the custom of nearly a
hundred years, that the public lands of the United States .. . shall be free to the people who
seek to use them, where they are left open and uninclosed, and no act of government forbids
this use.
Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890).
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and other commercial activities. Some land-use management decisions are
made by legislation; others are delegated by Congress to the management
agencies themselves, either as a matter of system-wide policy or of unit-by-unit
decision making.
The central descriptive claim of this Article is that private claims to public
resources are durable. The italicized words require some clarification and
expansion. By "claim," I refer to formal rights of use, specified by law, that fall
short of permanent property interests recognized by law. As noted earlier, this
distinction is not as clear as one might expect. Private entities may acquire
interests on public lands that fall short of complete fee-simple ownership but are
nonetheless protectable property interests. It is black letter law that a valid
mining claim, for example, is a property interest good against even the govern-
ment, yet the holder of a mining claim may not fully exclude others from the
claimed land. 3 8 No mineral lawyer would be surprised to learn that mining
claims are "durable," given their status as property rights.39 What is somewhat
more surprising, however, is that even claims that lack the formal status of
property are roughly as durable as those interests that are denominated as
property.40 Thus, one aspect of this Article's descriptive claim is that various
private claims on public lands are treated more or less as though they were
protectable property interests, even when they are not so in the formal nomencla-
ture of the law.
As noted, durability connotes more than simply long duration; it refers also to
claims' resilience and robustness in the face of pressure or opposition-the
survival of claims despite circumstances that would seem to suggest their
incompatibility with prevailing public policy.4 1 One way of restating the basic
claim is as follows: when the federal government retains legal authority to
terminate or limit private claims or to allow them to expire, it exercises this
37. Jan Laitos and Richard Westfall distinguish between six classes of private interests that may
arise on federal lands: vested rights, nonvested protectable property rights, protected possessory
interests, nondiscretionary entitlements, rights of possession, and applications. Laitos & Westfall, supra
note 17, at 9-19.
38. The claimant has the right to extract the minerals, but as the paramount owner, the United States
retains the right to use the land for all purposes not inconsistent with the right to mine. 4 GEORGE
CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERr L. GLICKSMAN, Punic NATURAL RESOURCEs LAw § 42:2 (2d ed. 2013).
39. Of course, in one respect, to say that mining claims are durable because they are property only
begs the question: why does the federal government essentially give away property interests in
minerals? This is an important and contested question and one not totally unrelated to my inquiry;
however, my interest is primarily in exposing and explaining the nature of property formally owned by
the state, rather than discussing further the durability of private property interests in American law,
which is well-known.
40. Even recreational users of public lands, such as hikers, mountain bikers, and snowmobilers,
whose use of public lands is entirely at the discretion of the managing agency, often behave as if-and
are treated as if-they were entitled to the use of such lands. See generally Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A.
Carr, The Transformation on Public Lands, 26 Ecouxw L.Q. 140 (1999) (describing the rise of
recreational use of federal lands and the increase in conflict between recreational users, other users, and
land managers).
41. See supra note 15.
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authority less frequently than would seem appropriate given current policy
objectives. This is a second aspect of this Article's descriptive claim. 4 2
The remainder of this section will offer a number of examples. First, it will
examine the common legislative practice of grandfathering existing private
claims to survive changes in the classification of public lands. It will then
describe a set of instances in which private claims are extended or renewed in
circumstances that would seem to militate against such treatment.
A. GRANDFATHERING
Perhaps the most common and straightforward example of the durability of
private claims to public property can be found in the numerous instances in
which private claims are grandfathered to survive a change in land classifica-
tion. Congress and the federal land management agencies regularly tinker with
the legal status of various federal landholdings. Historically, the majority of
changes in land status impose, rather than remove, restrictions on land use. This
occurs, for example, when public domain land is declared a national park or
monument or is "withdrawn" from certain uses.4 3 It is quite common, however,
for such changes in land-use policy to apply only prospectively, exempting
claimants who initiated the now-disfavored land use before the change in
status-just as changes in municipal land-use regulation generally provide for
the continuation of nonconforming uses.'
To get a sense for the extent of this practice, one need only thumb through
public-lands law. Take, for example, the most extensive public-lands bill en-
acted in recent years: the Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009.45
This bill established a number of new wilderness areas, three new national
parks, and a national monument; it also added to the National Wild and Scenic
Rivers System. 4 6 Browsing the legislation, one can readily discern that Con-
gress assiduously avoided the disruption of present land uses. The wilderness
designations, for example, carefully carve out pre-existing activities-allowing,
for example, "the grazing of livestock . . . if established before the date of
enactment of this Act."47 One provision explicitly authorizes the continuation of
a "competitive running event" that had occurred in each of the five years
42. The descriptive claim can easily slide into the normative claim that private claims endure too
long-but "too long," of course, is largely in the eye of the beholder. To be clear, then, the principal
goal of this section is descriptive; Part Ill will explore the normative implications of the claims
developed here.
43. "Withdrawal" is a term of art in the public-lands context; as the text suggests, it refers to statutes
or agency directives according to which land is made unavailable for certain types of use. See 2 GaioH(;I
CAMERON CocaINS & Roniuxr L. GLICKSMAN, Puniic NATURAL RI:SouRclEs LAw § 14:1 (2d ed. 2013).
44. See, e.g., Serkin, supra note 18.
45. Pub. L. No. 111-11, 123 Stat. 991 (2009).
46. Id.; see also Noelle Straub & Eric Bontrager, Obaina Signs Natural Resources Omnibus into
Law, E&E Niws PM (Mar. 30, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/stories/76198.
47. See. e.g., Omnibus Public Land Management Act of 2009 § 1405(c)(3). For similar provisions,
see id. §§ 1503(b)(3)(A), 1602(c)(3), 1702(c)(3), 1752(b)(3), 1803(h).
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preceding the bill's passage. 48 Nearly every change in land status is declared to
be "subject to valid existing rights"-indeed, the phrase is used sixty-three
times in the legislation.49
These "valid existing rights" provisions have become boilerplate in natural
resources law. It is seldom clear exactly which rights would otherwise be
implicated by a particular law, regulation, or executive order.50 But in any
event, one would be hard-pressed to find instances in which land withdrawals
have extinguished pre-existing private claims. 5 ' Most debates over withdrawals
presuppose the survival of existing rights and focus instead on prospective
limitations on the entry of new claims.5 2 Even the law dictating the manage-
ment of wilderness, the most restrictive public land classification, reveals
Congress's desire to leave many existing private activities undisturbed by
subsequent changes in land status., 3
48. Id. § 1001(c).
49. Several other provisions accomplish the same end with different wording, for example, "subject
to valid rights in existence on the date of enactment of this Act." Id. § 1803(d).
50. See C(KGINS ET AL.., supra note I1, at 343 (noting that it is unclear whether lawmakers wish to do
more than merely protect themselves from unwittingly extinguishing property rights that would require
the payment of compensation). For recent examples of "valid existing rights" provisions in executive
withdrawals, one can consult the most recently created national monuments. See, e.g., Proclamation
No. 8944, 78 Fed. Reg. 18769 (Mar. 25, 2013) ("The establishment of the monument is subject to valid
existing rights."). These provisions may prove useful in part because many interests on the federal lands
have never been recorded. Most notable (and troublesome) in this regard are the thousands of municipal
rights-of-way created under a Civil War-era statute known as R.S. 2477. 43 U.S.C. § 932 (repealed
1976). "[Tlhe establishment of R.S. 2477 rights of way required no administrative formalities: no entry,
no application, no license, no patent, and no deed on the federal side; no formal act of public
acceptance on the part of the states or localities in whom the right was vested." S. Utah Wilderness
Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 741 (10th Cir. 2005).
51. There is one noteworthy exception to this generalization. Many land withdrawals and reserva-
tions in U.S. history, dating back at least to the creation of Yellowstone National Park, have extin-
guished and granted no legal force to pre-existing claims that might arise on account of Native
Americans' occupation of the lands at issue. As Karl Jacoby put it in his important account. "[t]he
vision of nature that [Yellowstone's] backers sought to enact ... was predicated on eliminating any
Indian presence from the Yellowstone landscape." KARL JACOBY, CRIMEs AcAINST NATURE: SQuArri;Rs,
POACHERS, THIEVIS, AND THE HimINN HisToRy oi: AMERICAN CoNsERvAON 87 (2001). See also STUART
BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE FRONTIER (2005) (providing a
comprehensive historical explanation of how time, place, and the balance of power between the Native
Americans and settlers led to the Native Americans' loss of their land); LINDsAy G. RonliRTSON,
CONQUisT nY LAw: HOW THE DiscovIRY 01o AMERICA Disi'ossissin INoIENous Pvoi'ui:s op Tails LANDS
(2005) (investigating the historical origins of the Johnson v. M'Intosh decision leading to the massive
displacement of Native Americans).
52. For example, in an ongoing squabble over the Obama administration's withdrawal of land near
the Grand Canyon from uranium mining, all parties acknowledge that existing mines and valid
pre-existing claims are unaffected. See, e.g., Manuel Quinones, Controversial Uranium Projects
Proceed Near Grand Canyon, 'Sacred' Mountain, Rii.oixi CILEARINGHOUSE (May 13, 2013), http://
www.rich.org/news/controversial-uranium-projects-proceed-near-grand-canyon-sacred-mountain.
53. See Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, § 4(d)(1), 78 Stat. 890. 894 (1964) (stating that "the use
of aircraft or motorboats, where these uses have already become established, may be permitted to
continue subject to such restrictions as the Secretary ... deems desirable"); see also Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976 § 603(c), 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (2006) (requiring wilderness
management of Bureau of Land Management (BLM) land "subject, however, to the continuation of
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It is obvious, yet worth making explicit, that these claims survive in spite of
prima facie evidence that Congress would prefer a different policy to obtain
with respect to the designated land. It seems clear from the regularity of the
pattern-a prospective ban on particular land uses combined with a carve-out
for existing users-that, at least as a matter of modem practice, federal land
management prioritizes deference to existing users above uniformity in land
use. This sort of grandfathering is not unique to public-lands law; indeed,
grandfathering is commonplace across many areas of regulation.54 It may be
common because it is the political price of achieving legal change; it also may
reflect a preference among policymakers for liberal transition relief. Or perhaps
there are normative justifications for grandfathering, grounded in fairness or the
promotion of legal and economic stability.55 But let us set aside for now the
question of why grandfathering occurs and move on to other examples of the
durability of private claims to public property.
B. CLAIM EXTENSION, RENEWAL, AND NONTERMINATION
Another set of examples may be drawn from resource regimes in which the
law provides for the limitation or expiration of private claims, but as a matter of
actual administration, such limitation or expiration does not occur when it might
be expected on the basis of relevant circumstances. We might think of this,
in some respects, as a softer form of grandfathering-an informal, uncodified
policy of deference to existing claimants when policy change is otherwise
adverse to the claimant.
Observers of western land management, for example, often note the remark-
able staying power of ranching operations on the public lands in the western
states.5 6 The practice of grazing enormous cattle herds on the western range
grew exponentially in the latter half of the 1800s-so rapidly, in fact, that
before the turn of the century, millions of acres of public land had been ravaged
existing mining and grazing uses and mineral leasing in the manner and degree in which the same was
being conducted on October 21, 1976").
54. See Huber, supra note 25, at 94 n.15 ("By no means is this phenomenon limited to environmen-
tal policy; pressure for transition relief can arise whenever existing interests are threatened. Relief has
been provided, for example, in connection with . . . .").
55. Id. at 107-14; see also Serkin, supra note 18, at 1261-81 (considering potential justifications for
protection of existing uses). Grandfathering also reflects an implicit decision to treat the present as the
baseline for future assessments of land use; for an analysis of the issues attendant to the use of historic
baselines, see, for example, J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The Theory and Practice of
Historic Baselines in the Administrative State, 64 VAND. L. REV. I (2011).
56. For colorful and fascinating accounts of public-lands grazing see, for example, WESiY CALEF,
PRIVATE GRAZING AND Pu.ic LANDS: STUDIES OF THE LoCAL MANAGEMENT OF THE TAYLOR GRAZING Ac-r
(1960); PHILUw 0. Foss, POLITICS AN! GRASS: THE ADMINISTRATION OF GRAZING ON THE Putic DoMAIN
(1960); MIKE HUDAK, WESTERN TURF WARS: THE Poarrics o Pu.ic LANDs RANCHING (2007); KAREN R.
MERRILL, PUBLic LANDS AND PonITIcAL MEANING: RANCHERS, THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE PRoiary
B iurwEEN THEM (2002); WILKINSON, supra note 21, at 75-113.
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by overgrazing. After decades of political wrangling, the range came under
federal regulation." Ranchers were required to obtain grazing permits and to
pay a grazing fee, and federal land managers were authorized to reduce grazing
allotments should range conditions require it.5 9 Thus ranchers' rights of use on
the public lands appear on paper to be far less durable than, say, mining claims.
As a matter of hard law, this is indisputably true; courts have repeatedly
confirmed that a grazing permit does not constitute a property right.60 But as a
matter of administrative practice, federal grazing permits have been and are
renewed so reliably that banks customarily capitalize the permits' value into the
ranches to which they are adjacent.6 1 Yes, you read that right: banks are willing
to lend against the value of a terminable grazing permit. One must assume that
the banks have realized that such grazing rights, though insecure on paper, are,
in actuality, quite stable. This remains true in spite of myriad analyses suggest-
ing that public lands are overgrazed and numerous calls for reductions in
public-lands grazing.6 2
Another example may be found among the nation's largest ski resorts, most
of which operate, at least partially, on land owned by the federal government
and managed by the U.S. Forest Service. The private resort managers must
obtain use and occupancy agreements from the Forest Service, which must in
turn satisfy a host of administrative requirements before granting permission to
use federal land. The terms of the use and occupancy agreements need not
concern us here; what is most relevant for our purposes is that once resorts have
been constructed and established, licenses are renewed as a matter of course.
57. See E. LouisiE PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE Puntic DOMAIN: DISPOSAL AND RESERVATION PoLIcIIs,
1900-1950, at 26-27 (1951). Even a young Teddy Roosevelt predicted that overgrazing would
decimate the rangelands. See generally THEODORE RooslvEx, HUNTING TRIPS OF A RANCHMAN (New
York, G. P. Putnam's Sons 1885).
58. The seminal legislation was the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-482, 48 Stat. 1269
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (2006)).
59. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1732(c), 1752(a) (2006).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973); see also 3 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS
& Romiarr L. GI.CKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAl. REsoURCEs LAw § 33:4 (2d ed. 2013).
61. See, e.g., CALEF, supra note 56, 64 at 135-36; Foss, supra note 56, 64. But see Fuller, 409 U.S.
at 493 (giving no compensation for an Arizona rancher for the increment of value of condemned land
that was associated with a grazing permit).
62. See, e.g., DEBRA L. DONAHUE, THE WESTERN RANGE REVIsm: REMOVING LIvESTOCK FROM PUBLIC
LANoS T) CONSERVE NATIVE BIODIVERSITY (1999); CuRTIs H. FrATHER EL AL., U.S. DiE'T OF AGRIC., FOREST
SERv., SPECIES ENDANGERMENT PATrERNS IN THE UNITED STAWS (1994); WELFARE RANCHING: THE SUBSI-
DIZED DisTRucrION OF THE AMERICAN WEsT (George Wuerthner & Mollie Matteson eds., 2002); Thomas L.
Fleischner, Ecological Costs of Livestock Grazing in Western North America, 8 CONSERVATION BioiOY
629 (1994). A number of advocacy groups are committed to reducing or eliminating public-lands
grazing, including the National Public Lands Grazing Campaign, the Western Watersheds Project,
WildEarth Guardians, and the Sierra Club.
63. At least 121 ski resorts in thirteen states include land leased from the federal government,
representing some 60% of the total annual skier and snowboarder visits in the United States. Federal
Impediments to Water Rights, Job Creation and Recreation: A Local Perspective: Hearing Before the
H. Subcomm. on Water & Power, Il3th Cong. 1-3 (2013) (statement of Geraldine Link, Director of
Public Policy, National Ski Areas Association).
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Not a single ski resort has closed its doors for want of a renewed use and
occupancy agreement.64
Of course, this outcome is in many ways unremarkable. The construction of a
ski resort is no small economic proposition. Ski resorts bring enormous public
benefits, and if the Forest Service decided those benefits justified the initial
construction of a resort, then what reason might there be for tearing it down
later? At the same time, it is intriguing to note that, though the Forest Service
has reliably renewed use and occupancy agreements, it has also ceased to grant
permission for the development of new ski resorts.65 We seem to have arrived
at a situation in which existing ski resort developers are more or less grand-
fathered in to the use of federal land for such purposes, while other would-be
developers are, as it were, left out in the cold.66
A similar story could be told regarding the construction of hydropower
facilities on federal lands. Roughly three-quarters of all federally licensed dams
are in private ownership.67 Many of these facilities occupy federal land; all
require a permit from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and,
in some sense, encumber a public resource. 8 Dams, of course, in many
instances represent an even larger capital outlay than ski resorts, and for this
reason developers have historically demanded (and received) a lengthy and
secure operating license.69 FERC generally issues licenses for a thirty- to
fifty-year term.70 These, too, are renewed regularly, even though the federal
courts have ordered agencies to think of relicensing as "more akin to an
64. In fact, not only are renewals a matter of course, but requests to expand operations into
additional Forest Service acreage are nearly always granted as well. A recent denial of an expansion
plan was one of the first ever and was met by consternation from resort owners. Colorado Ski Resorts
Worried by Forest Service Ruling, USA ToDAY (Dec. 14, 2009, 5:00 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.coml
travel/destinations/skil2009-12-14-crested-butte-expansionN.htm.
65. This is true as a matter of its decisional record; there is no formal Forest Service policy to this
effect. See, e.g., April Reese, Proposal for North America's Biggest Ski Resort Raises Ruckus in
Montana, LAND LiaWR (June 14, 2007), http://www.eenews.net/landletter/2007/06/14/stories/55066.
The most recent resort to open on Forest Service land in Colorado, for example, was in 1980. See James
Brooke, Environmentalists Battle Growth of Ski Resorts, N.Y. TIMi~s. Jan. 19, 1999, http://
www.nytimes.com/1999/01/19/us/environmentalists-battle-growth-of-ski-resorts.htmi.
66. See, e.g., Perry Backus, Forest Service Again Rejects Maclay t Ski Resort on Lo Peak,
MISSOULIAN (Sept. 7, 2012, 6:30 AM), http://missoulian.com/news/local/forest-service-again-rejects-
maclay-s-ski-resort-on-lolo/article_606ad8 1 0-f86b-e leI-82c7-00I9bb2963f4.html.
67. DouGLAs G. HAIL. & Kii.LY S. Ri~ives, A STUDY o1 UNITED STATEs HYiDROLI I.CLrIC PLANT
OWNERSHII 2 (2006), available at http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/water/pdfs/doewater-11519.pdf. Pri-
vately owned dams, however, generate only about a quarter of the hydropower generated domestically.
The difference owes to the fact that the largest dams in America are all publicly owned. Id. at 2-4.
68. See generally 4 GIoRUI CAMERON C(xMINS & ROiRT L. GLICKSMAN, Pum.IC NATURAL Ri:SouRcEIS
LAw § 37 (2d ed. 2013) (describing the process by which permits are acquired from the FERC);
Christopher Scoones, Let the River Run: Strategies to Remove Obsolete Dams and Defeat Resulting
Fifth Amendment Taking Claims, 2 SliArnt.i J. ENVTI.. L. 1, 19-24 (2012) (describing FERC's hydro-
power relicensing procedure as one of three legal ways to remove dams whose existence no longer
benefits the public because of environmental, safety, or economic concerns).
69. See, e.g., HAYs, supra note 14, at 73-81 (discussing power companies' battle with lawmakers in
the early twentieth century to achieve favorable water-power policies).
70. 4 CXalNS & GIICKSMAN, supra note 38, § 37:11.
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irreversible and irretrievable commitment of a public resource than a mere
continuation of the status quo." 7 ' This is a somewhat ironic formulation, given
that FERC consistently renews existing licenses but has not authorized the
construction of a new large dam in several decades, and regularly denies
applications even for smaller facilities.72
So why should anyone be surprised when agencies renew the occupancy
rights of ski resorts or dams? What sense could it make to refuse to renew such
rights? For now, suffice it to say that there are, in the minds of many, a number
of reasons to rethink federal resource policy with respect to dams and ski
resorts, and-much more to the point-that federal policy has in fact been
changed, either expressly or in fact, to reflect this change in attitudes. No new
major facilities have been constructed in either category in recent years. Exist-
ing lease or permit holders find themselves in a special and privileged category.
They have, in essence, a priority right to the continued use of public property,
and it is a position from which they are not easily dislodged. These parties are
more or less grandfathered out of the new era in which their uses are disfavored
and need not fear that the new policy will sweep away their existing uses-at
least not in the vast majority of instances.
These cases-grazing, ski resorts, hydropower-are relatively straightfor-
ward, and are ones in which the durability of existing claims has been oft-noted
and criticized. The remainder of this section examines in greater detail several
more subtle examples in which claim durability has not been commonly noted.
The first two cases are especially important, as they bear on some of the most
economically substantial activities carried out on public lands: oil and gas
leasing, and coal production. The third case, examining private residential
claims within national parks, is not nearly as significant from an economic
perspective, but it helps to demonstrate the pervasiveness of the pattern de-
scribed in this section.
1. Oil and Gas Leasing
In order to examine the oil and gas context, some general background is
necessary. Oil and gas development is seldom conducted directly by a land-
owner. Rather, landowners (or, in the context of split estates, owners of the
71. See Yakima Indian Nation v. FERC, 746 F.2d 466,476 (9th Cir. 1984).
72. For a description of the end of the "Big Dam" era, see Dan Tarlock, The Legal-Political Barriers
to Ramping Up Hydro, 86 CHI.-KtNT L. Riv. 259, 264-70 (2011). For examples of current dam license
denials, see FERC Nixes Application for McKenzie River Hydro Plants, ORtCoNLivt: (Feb. 16, 2008,
2:51 PM), http://blog.oregonlive.com/breakingnews/2008/02/ferc nixes application formck.html.
73. See, e.g., STEvEN HAwiiv, RI:coviRING A LosT RiviaR: RtiMovING DAMs, Rviwn.mNG SALMON,
RtivrrAutzING COMMUNITIES (2011) (advocating the removal of federal dams to restore salmon habitat on
the Snake River); Michael C. Blumm & Andrew B. Erickson, Damn Removal in the Pacific Northwest:
Lessons for the Nation, 42 ENvTI.. L. 1043, 1045-47 (2012) (noting that the era of dam construction has
given way to a series of dam removals in the Northwest): Michael T. Pyle, Beyond Fish Ladders: Damn
Removal as a Strategy for Restoring Amnericas Rivers, 14 STAN. ENvTl. L.J. 97 (1995) (detailing the
rationale and legal bases for dam removal).
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subsurface resource) 74 enter into lease arrangements with specialized oil and
gas companies.7" Two of the most important provisions of an oil and gas lease
are its term and its payment structure. The term is more accurately thought of as
an option: if oil or gas has not been produced by the end of the stated period,
then the lease expires automatically; whereas if production has occurred, the
lease continues indefinitely until production ceases. Therefore, although it may
appear that the interests of the oil company and the landowner are aligned
according to their common desire to get oil out of the ground, there are
important respects in which their interests are deeply at odds. The producer will
prefer as long a term as possible in order to preserve the option of production
(and to lock up the property from other producers), while the landowner will
prefer as short a term as possible in order to expedite her royalty payments.
Royalties, which are dependent on production, are only one component of
the payment structure; the other is the bonus payment, a one-time lump-sum
payment to secure the lease. The bonus is paid at the signing of the lease and is
retained by the landowner even if no production ever occurs. A rational and
profit-seeking landowner, therefore, will hasten to pursue a new lease arrange-
ment if no production has taken place by the time of the initial lease's expiration
because a new lease means a second bonus payment. Conversely, oil and gas
firms seek to maintain portfolios of property rights that extend as far into the
future as possible to allow them to maximize their flexibility and their ability
to respond to changing market conditions. Oil or gas plays that may be
unprofitable now may become highly desirable just a few years hence. And so,
unsurprisingly, it is quite common for legal disputes to arise over the question
of whether a lease has in fact terminated under its own provisions. A great deal
of case law explores the issue of lease termination, analyzing the myriad form
contracts that circulate through oil and gas transactions.76
At first glance, the law governing oil and gas leasing on federal lands appears
74. A split estate arises when the rights to the mineral or subsurface estate (or some portion thereof)
lying beneath a parcel of land are severed from the rights to the surface. An ordinary purchase and sale
of real estate conveys both surface and subsurface rights, but split estates are quite common in oil and
gas-rich locales and can raise a host of thorny legal and practical problems. For ease, I will simply use
"landowner" to include both owners of undivided estates as well as owners of subsurface resources.
75. As is often noted, the term "lease" is a bit of a misnomer, because an oil or gas lease grants the
lessee ownership of the produced commodity. Furthermore, a typical oil or gas lease remains in effect
until production ceases, making it a determinable estate rather than a term-of-years lease.
76. This sort of conflict has been occurring with increasing frequency during the current natural gas
boom. Landowners who leased their land before they became aware of the magnitude of the boom
often received much smaller payments than their neighbors who held out longer. The early sellers are
therefore eager to exit their leases and negotiate new leases on better terms. See, e.g., Saqib Rahim,
N.Y Reaches Deal with Chesapeake on Lease Renewals, ENERGYWIRE (June 15, 2012), http://
www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1 059965946 (discussing recent dispute over the termination date of
leases in New York); see also Aukema v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 904 F. Supp. 2d 199, 210-12
(N.D.N.Y. 2012); Beardslee v. Inflection Energy, LLC, 904 F. Supp. 2d 213, 220-21 (N.D.N.Y. 2012).
In these two federal suits, the courts found that leases that expired at the end of their primary term were
not extended under terms of force majeure based on the state of New York's moratorium on hydraulic
fracturing at the time.
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to track the contractual arrangements that are typical of private lease transac-
tions." Upon further inspection, however, one can see that the Mineral Leasing
Act78 -the statute that governs federal oil and gas leasing-is quite a bit more
generous towards lessees than the conventional private oil and gas lease. And
if we look beyond the letter of the law to its implementation, most of the
resemblance to the private oil and gas scene all but disappears. In the words of
leading commentators, "[u]nlike private lessors, the United States sometimes
tries harder to keep leases in force than to terminate them."79 These writers go
on to note the "seemingly absurd lengths" of "federal leniency."80
Like most private oil and gas leasing deals, the Mineral Leasing Act frame-
work grants lessees a primary term, which acts as an option; if the option is
taken, the term will extend until production ceases. The primary term for
onshore leases is set by statute at ten years,8 which is considerably longer
than terms offered by many private leases. 8 2 The Bureau of Land Management
(BLM)-the entity primarily responsible for managing mineral development on
federal onshore lands-has no discretion under the statute to choose a shorter
term to incentivize more rapid production, a fact pointed out by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) in a critical 2008 report.8 3 More recently, oppo-
nents of federal leasing policy have charged that the ten-year term is unreason-
ably favorable to lessees, allowing them to tie up land in ways unintended by
the statute.8
Not only is the federal statutory lease term longer than most privately
negotiated leases, but federal law also allows leases to be extended much more
readily than is the case in typical private transactions. Most private leases
automatically terminate if production has not commenced before the end of the
primary term, but federal law grants an automatic two-year extension merely for
77. See 4 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 38, § 39:28 ("Federal oil and gas leasing is more similar
to the parallel private market than the other federal commodity disposition programs . . .. Private oil
and gas leases are structured to force the lessee to drill or forfeit the lease, a diligence requirement
mostly, but not entirely, duplicated in the federal context.").
78. Mineral Leasing Act, ch. 85, § 1, 41 Stat. 437 (1920) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 181
(2012)).
79. 4 COGINs & GICKSMAN, supra note 38, § 39:1.
80. Id. § 39:26.
81. 30 U.S.C. § 226(e) (2012). Until 1992, the law provided for a five-year primary term for leases
sold competitively, but this provision was changed in the Energy Policy Act of 1992.
82. See U.S. Gov'T AccoUNTAIn.ITY Oi1ic,;, GAO-09-74, OIL AND GAS LEASING: INTERIOR COULD Do
MORE TO ENCOURAGE DILiENT DiVELOPME3NT 8 (2008) [hereinafter GAO 2008 REPoRT].
8 3. Id.
84. There have been recent battles, including in the 2012 presidential campaign, over "use it or lose
it" legislation that would incentivize action on existing leases by disallowing new leases to entities that
are not producing or diligently developing existing leases. See Ben Geman, Pelosi Eyes Changes to
'Use It or Lose It'Bill, ENv'T & ENERGY DAuY (July 16, 2008), http://www.eenews.net/eedaily/stories/
66941. The GAO report argued that the Department of the Interior could better incentivize rapid
development. See GAO 2008 REPORT, supra note 82, at 29.
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the commencement of drilling during the primary term." Leases may also be
extended when joined with neighboring leases into a drilling unit, a common
legal tool known as unitization. The GAO report found that oil and gas firms
regularly use these extensions,8 7 and scholars have suggested that the unitiza-
tion extension in particular is abused precisely to secure lease extensions.
Furthermore, federal law deviates from private transactional norms in its
approach to the termination of a producing lease. The typical private lease
terminates automatically when paying production ceases and does not recom-
mence within a period specified in the contract, generally sixty or ninety days.
No action is required by the lessor to effect this termination. Under federal law,
however, the federal government is first required to give notice to the lessee,
after which the lessee has sixty days to place a well back into production.9 o
Thus, an oil and gas company with relative ease may extend a lease for an
additional two years beyond the lease's primary term, and once production has
commenced, the lessee can continue to hold the lease even when production
ceases, knowing that the government must provide notice before the lease will
terminate. In practice, the BLM sometimes waits years before giving notice, or
it offers more than one notice of termination.9 ' More generally, the BLM has
acknowledged that it sometimes allows lessees multiple opportunities to cure
legal problems rather than seeking termination of a lease. Again, such a
85. 30 U.S.C. § 226(e); 43 C.F.R. 3107 (2012). For a discussion of some decisions dealing with this
provision, see Santa Fe Energy Res., Inc., 138 Interior Dec. 133 (IBLA 1997). Some states have
adopted similar extension policies with respect to state lands. See New Coalbed Methane Drilling Lease
Policy Implemented, ENIRCYWIRE (June 20, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/
1059966132 (noting that the Wyoming Board of Land Commissioners has "almost routinely approved
extensions, even if there was no production").
86. GAO 2008 RatloRT, supra note 82, at 10.
87. Id.
88. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations, Oversight, & Regulations of the H. Comm.
on Small Bus., 112th Cong. 5-8 (2012) (statement of Mark Squillace, Professor of Law and Director,
Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of Law); see also 4 GtionOa CAMERON
CoouNS & RomRT L. GLICKSMAN, PuBIC NATURAL RIsouRCs LAw § 39:27 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing
some aspects of unitization agreements and the standards for approving unitization applications).
89. See NANCY SAINT-PAUt, SUMMERS Ot. & GAS § 14:7 & n.3 (3d ed. 2012).
90. 30 U.S.C. § 226(f) (2012); see also JOHN S. LOwt FT At., CASES AND MAnMA.S UN Ot AND GAS
LAw 863 (5th ed. 2008) (discussing lit re Great Plains Petroleum, Inc., 117 Interior Dec. 130 (IBLA
1990)). See especially note I following the case, highlighting the difference between private leases and
federal practice. The relevant regulations implementing this statutory provision can be found at 43
C.F.R. § 3107.
91. See, e.g., Doud Land Co., 182 Interior Dec. 234 (IBLA 2012). In this case, the BLM provided
not one, but three sixty-day notices several years apart, and finally declared a lease termi-
nated after the third notice. The Interior Board of Land Appeals had little difficulty concluding that,
as a matter of law, the lease terminated upon the initial notice-fully seven years before the BLM
declaration.
92. See, e.g., Most Oil Leases on Public Lands Go Unused, AssociAni) PR:sS, June 1, 2004,
available at http://www.nbcnews.com/id/5 Il 1I84/ns/usnews-environment/t/most-oil-leases-public-lands-
go-unused ("Tom Brown is one of a half dozen large oil companies that in recent years have exceeded
the federal limit on the number of leased acres they can control in any one state. BLM officials
acknowledged that they have granted repeated extensions for the companies to comply with the law,
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practice bears little resemblance to the world of private oil and gas transactions;
here, perhaps, we see the aforementioned "seemingly absurd lengths" of "fed-
eral leniency."9 3
Although federal oil and gas leasing practices differ from standard practices
among private entities, this fact is not necessarily problematic in and of itself.
Federal lawmakers may have good reasons for departing from private norms
(although it is somewhat more difficult to justify practices that essentially forfeit
additional bonus payments). Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that both standard-
ized federal leasing terms and standard administrative practice result in leases
that are both lengthy and difficult to terminate.
Offshore oil and gas development, though governed by a different federal
agency and a different portion of the U.S. Code, is similar in many respects.
Lease terms are fixed by statute at eight years for shallow water drills and ten
for deepwater.9 4 Ostensibly because of the expenses associated with offshore
drilling and its highly speculative nature, firms seek to keep these leases alive
for as long as possible. And just as with onshore leases, offshore leases are often
extended beyond their initial term pursuant to an extension provision in federal
law.95 In the offshore context, however, there is one additional tool, seldom
invoked for onshore leases, that allows the federal government to extend leases:
lease suspension. Suspended leases are extended by law to compensate for the
period of suspension. Because suspension is authorized for a wide range of
circumstances, federal officials have broad discretion in this area and sometimes
instead of exercising their legal right to cancel leases of companies in violation of the law."). Also, the
Department of the Interior has at times unilaterally relieved lessees of lease requirements when "low oil
prices threatened leasehold viability." See 4 CoXnaNs & GLICKSMAN, supra note 38, § 39:1 n.10.
93. See 4 CoomNs & GLICKSMAN, supra note 38, § 39:26.
94. See Noelle Straub, Industry Opposes Shortened Gulf of Mexico Lease Terms, Gali:Nwtul;
(Nov. 16, 2009), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2009/1l/16/stories/8468 1.
95. See 30 C.F.R. § 250.180 (2012) (granting offshore extensions). In a lawsuit, Exxon appears to
claim that federal lease extensions were also routine. See Exxon Fights to Keep One of Largest-Ever
Gulf of Mexico Discoveries, GRuIENwImi (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/
1059952936 (noting that "[i]n its lawsuit, Exxon says that the government has granted 'thousands' of
lease extensions before and that a denial of extensions 'had never before applied and had never before
articulated [sic]' by the government").
96. The Mineral Leasing Act also provides that the Interior Secretary may suspend onshore drilling
operations for a variety of reasons. See 30 U.S.C. § 209 (2012); see also 43 C.F.R. § 3103.4-1 (2012)
(giving the Secretary the authority to waive, suspend, or reduce leasehold royalties); 4 C(KlGINS &
GLICKSMAN, supra note 38, § 39:10 (describing the lengthening of lease terms by suspension). For
example, the BLM has suspended leases in Utah on account of endangered species issues. See, e.g.,
Dan Berman, Endangered Ferret Forces Suspension of BLM Leases in Utah, GREalNWIRE (Dec. 19,
2006), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/50187.
97. According to statute, leases may be suspended when it is "in the national interest," or "to
facilitate proper development of a lease," or when there is a "threat of serious ... harm" to property or
the environment. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(1) (2006). Lease suspension may also be granted when other
legal requirements have been imposed that would interfere with timely production. For example, the
Department of the Interior suspended many deepwater leases following the Deepwater Horizon disaster
because a moratorium prevented activity on those leases in any event. See Phil Taylor, Interior Honors
98% of Requested Deepwater Lease Extensions, E&ENws PM (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/
eenewspm/stories/1059955733. See generally' AlAM VANN, CONG. RisAuRC SuiRv., RL33404, OFFSHORE
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use suspension as a tool precisely for the purpose of extending a lease for the
benefit of oil and gas exploration and development." This occurs, to some
degree, because of the highly politicized atmosphere surrounding offshore oil
production. Famous oil spills like those near Santa Barbara, California; Prince
William Sound in Alaska; and the Deepwater Horizon event off the Louisiana
coast have led to lengthy moratoria in offshore oil production.99 Many Califor-
nia politicians have steadfastly opposed additional drilling off the coast of the
Golden State; oil companies, therefore, have fought long and hard to keep alive
the few outstanding leases to waters off the California coast. Most notably, the
oil industry succeeded in extending thirty-six leases, originally acquired during
the early 1980s, by requesting and receiving repeated suspensions from succes-
sive administrations."1'
Of course, in the offshore context, there is no comparison to be made with
private transactions; private entities cannot own the Outer Continental Shelf.
Furthermore, even if the government's sole objective was to maximize revenue
(as we might assume of a rational private landowner), it could be argued that
extending existing leases is preferable to obtaining new ones. The start-up time
in offshore drilling is long, and delays in development defer royalty income."o
And the Department of the Interior does, at times, allow leases to expire.' 02 But
all the same, federal oil and gas leasing terms provide opportunities for private
claimants to extend rights to public resources beyond what would generally be
available on private lands, or even what would appear to be allowable on the
face of federal law.
2. Coal Leasing
In the early days of the modem coal industry, coal mining took place
primarily on private land in the eastern half of the country. In roughly the past
half century, however, coal mining has moved west and onto federal land. 0 3 Of
OIL AND GAs Di:vui.oi'MiENT LiEGAiL FRAMEWORK 13-14 (2013) (discussing circumstances under which the
Secretary of the Interior may suspend or cancel leases).
98. See generally MARC HUMPHRIES, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RS22928, OIL DEVELOPMENT ON FEDERAL
LANDS AND THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF (2008) (discussing legislative proposals to lift the congres-
sional Outer Continental Shelf moratoria along the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific Coasts).
99. See generally CURRY L. HAGERTY, CONG. RESEARCH SiERv., R41132, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
MORATORIA ON OIL AN) GAs DEVELoiPMENT (2011) (discussing background and sources of legal authority
for imposing Outer Continental Shelf moratoria).
100. FRED BoSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AN) THE ENVIRONMENT 315 (3d ed. 2010). At the end
of the day, these leases did not result in production; a number of related disputes were eventually
resolved in the federal courts. See, e.g., Noble Energy, Inc. v. Salazar, 671 F.3d 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2012);
Amber Res. v. United States, 538 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
101. Royalty income from offshore production is substantial. Since 2000, the federal government
has received between $10 and $20 billion in annual revenues from Outer Continental Shelf oil
production. See HAGERTY, supra note 99, at 13 n.50.
102. Lawrence Hurley, Supreme Court Won't Hear Gulf Leasing Case, GREENWIRE (Apr. 25, 2011),
http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1059948184.
103. A. Dan Tarlock, The Making of Federal Coal Policy: Lessons for Public Lands Management
from a Failed Program, an Essay and Review, 25 NAT. REsoURCES J. 349, 351 (1985).
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particular note is the Powder River Basin in northern Wyoming and southern
Montana, which is perhaps the largest coal production region in the world.'0
The bulk of this region's coal mining takes place on federal public lands.
Private rights to federally owned coal are secured pursuant to a leasing system,
just as with oil and gas. 05 And like oil and gas leases on federal lands, private
coal leases are remarkable for their durability. This durability has taken two
forms over time: the first relates to the durability of specific leases, whereas the
second relates to the durability of actual coal mining operations through their
ability to secure successive, neighboring leases. The first form is now a histori-
cal artifact, and the second form has supplanted the first.
The durability of private claims to federal coal first became problematic over
a period stretching from roughly 1945 to 1970. During these years, energy
markets regarded coal and oil as substitutes; oil prices were remarkably stable
(largely due to state limitations on production on the basis of market de-
mand),'" but many energy firms nonetheless sought to buy up coal leases in
order to maintain inventories as a hedge against a rise in the price of oil.10 7
Thus, western coal reserves were essentially speculative investments; actual
development occurred only haltingly. 0 8 Federal coal leasing practices served
these purposes well. First, leases were relatively long-term-as long as twenty
years, with the possibility of renewal. But perhaps more importantly, the
Department of the Interior rarely enforced lease termination provisions.' 09 The
Department routinely suspended the Mineral Leasing Act's requirement that
leases be diligently developed and renewed leases on which no mining had
occurred." 0
In the years leading up to 1970, then, the acreage subject to coal leases
104. U.S. GEOLGucAL SURVEY, U.S. Di:e'T OF THE INTERIOR, FACT SHEET 2012-3143, ASSESSMENT OF
COA GEOLOGY, REsOuRCIs, AND RsEnSRvE BASE IN THE POWDER RIVER BASIN, WYOMING AND MONTANA,
(2013), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2012/3143/fs-2012-3143.pdf.
105. See generally 4 CoGINs & GLICKSMAN, supra note 38, § 38 (describing coal leasing practices
before and after adoption of the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act).
106. See BOSSELMAN IT AL., supra note 100, at 240, 269 (depicting crude oil prices as stable during
the mid-1900s and postulating that market-demand prorationing was responsible for this stability).
107. As was also evident in the discussion of oil and gas leasing, see supra section I.B.1, a
fundamental dynamic in the energy sector is that energy firms seek to hold rights to various energy
resources for strategic purposes, even without actual development. Such rights preserve firms' flexibil-
ity in the face of changes in economic conditions, activity by competitors, and the availability of
substitutes.
108. See 4 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 38, § 38:1 (noting that energy companies held reserves
"as hedges against petroleum depletion"). In the pages that follow, the authors note that total federal
acreage under lease soared in the 1950s and 1960s while actual production on federal land declined. See
id. § 38:7.
109. Leases were terminable with notice if not diligently developed, but apparently the Interior
Secretary never once canceled a lease for failure to comply with this condition. See id. § 38:1.
I 10. Id. §§ 38:1, :12; see also Mark Squillace, The Tragic Story of the Federal Coal Leasing
Program, 27 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 29, 30 (2013) (noting that "the diligent development require-
ment of the [Mineral Leasing Act] was largely ignored on most coal leases").
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increased, while production of coal from federal land actually declined."' Only
a small minority of outstanding federal coal leases were in actual production' -
and this was as the energy crisis of the 1970s loomed. The Department of the
Interior reacted by commencing an informal moratorium on new coal leases in
1971, which was formalized by Congress with the passage of the Federal Coal
Leasing Amendments Act (FCLAA) in 1976.' '3 The FCLAA grandfathered in
the pre-1971 leases but stiffened the law with respect to lease extension by
requiring the termination of any lease not in production after ten years.I 4 By
disallowing the gratuitous extension of specific leases, the Act effectively ended
the industry practice of amassing coal leases on a speculative basis.
In the wake of the FCLAA, the durability of coal leases took a different form.
Coal mining firms discovered that their ongoing operations could be extended
by way of the process for selecting tracts available for lease. Although the
FCLAA requires competitive bidding for coal leases, the law also allows coal
firms to nominate to the BLM the tracts of land that they would like to develop
in a process known as "lease by application."'' 5 This provision undermines the
competitive bidding requirement because it is a simple matter for firms to select
tracts that are unlikely to attract the attention of competitors. In the Powder
River Basin, for example, the overwhelming majority of the "competitive" lease
sales have only one bidder: the same company that suggested the tract in the
Ill. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Hughes, 437 F. Supp. 981, 984 (D.D.C. 1977) ("From
1945 to 1970, the number of acres of federal land leased for coal development increased from about
80,000 to approximately 778,000, almost a ten-fold increase. In the same period, annual coal produc-
tion from these federal lands declined from about 10 million tons in 1945 to approximately 7.4 million
tons in 1970.").
112. In 1976, only about 60 of 533 outstanding coal leases on federal land were in actual production.
4 CoMcNs & GIACKSMAN, supra note 38, § 38:1 n.20 (citing Solicitor's Opinion, M-36951 (Feb. 12,
1985)).
113. Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-377 (1976), 90 Stat. 1083
(codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 [2006]).
114. 4 C(KIlNs & GIACKSMAN, supra note 38, §§ 38:1, :12. The FCLAA also brought other important
changes, such as increasing the minimum royalty paid to the federal government to 12.5%. 30 U.S.C.
§ 207(a) (2006).
115. There are two ways that the BLM can initiate coal lease sales. First, the BLM may designate a
region as a "coal production region"; in such a region, lease sales would take place on tracts designated
by the BLM and selected for their marketability. See 43 C.F.R. § 3400 (2012). Second, outside of
designated coal production regions, the BLM may accept leases by application. The lease by applica-
tion process was to be initiated by the coal mining company, which could nominate to the BLM a tract
for auction. See 43 C.F.R. § 3425 (2012); 64 Fed. Reg. 52,240 (Sept. 28, 1999). At its discretion, the
BLM could place such a tract up for auction after completing the requisite market and environmental
analyses. In both cases, lease sales were expected to generate competitive bidding and thus to maximize
the revenue flowing to the federal government. In theory. the coal production region process would
govern lease sales in coal-rich areas and allow the BLM to design sales on terms favorable to the
federal landlord. In practice, however, this process was abandoned by the BLM in 1990 for reasons that
are still not entirely clear. The lease by application process has been used exclusively since then. See
Letter from Edward J. Markey, Ranking Member, House Comm. on Natural Res., to Gene Dodaro,
Comptroller Gen., U.S. Gov't Accountability Office (Apr. 24, 2012) (on file with author) (requesting
that the GAO create a report on federal coal leasing practices and providing further background): see
also Squillace, supra note 110, at 30-35.
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first place."' The tracts that are proposed and ultimately bid upon are tracts
immediately adjacent to existing mines."' 7 The start-up costs associated with
mining such tracts are minimal for adjacent mines, such that other companies
generally have no incentive even to submit a bid. And because the application
process allows the applicant to specify the size of the proposed tract, applicants
may select tracts that are small enough not to attract competition. The only
recent cases in which multiple bids have been entered in a Powder River Basin
sale have involved tracts between two existing mines, in which cases both of the
adjacent mines have submitted bids.""
In this way, an existing coal mine can leverage its competitive advantage
(attributable to its favorable location) to more or less guarantee that it will
secure a proposed lease. The federal leasing process itself, then, allows these
mining firms to develop expansion strategies that are relatively immune from
competitive pressure." 9 Once a foot is in the door, subsequent lease offerings
can be proposed and conducted on terms designed to be most favorable to the
existing firm. The system is virtually tailor-made to enhance the durability of
existing coal mining operations.
3. Personal Occupancies on Public Lands
Coal mining companies and oil giants are not the only entities to benefit from
durable claims to public natural resources. As a historical matter, the paradig-
matic private claimants to the public lands were settlers, homesteaders, ranch-
ers, and farmers-and although the era of settlement is long over, there are still
several ways that federal land management practices continue to extend land
claims made by individuals.
One might think that America's national park lands, representing the gems of
the public lands, would be protected from private claimants-and as a prospec-
tive matter, that is true.12 0 Yet within the borders of nearly every land unit
managed by the National Park Service, there are a number of pre-existing
private claims,' 2 ' and the federal government's management of these claims
116. Squillace, supra note 110, at 35 (noting that twenty-two of the last twenty-seven lease sales in
the Powder River Basin have attracted only one bidder).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See generally JEREMY NICHOLs, WI.IEARTH GUARDIANS, UNDIRMINING THE CLIMATI 16-22
(2009); Tom SANZIuIO, INsT. FOR ENERGY EcoN. & FIN. ANALYsis, THE GRI:AT GiVEAwAY: AN ANALYSIS 0I
THE UNITED STATis' LONG-TERM TREND 01I SELINi FiIRAuI-OwsNE COAL iioR Loss THAN FAIR MARKET
VALUi (2012). Both of these white papers describe in greater detail the lease-by-application process and
its negative effects on market competition.
120. National parks, along with most of the other properties managed by the National Park Service
(such as national seashores, lakeshores, monuments, etc.), are generally closed to mineral prospecting,
livestock grazing, and other activities commonly allowed on other federal public lands. See generally
3 CxGoos & GIICKSMAN, supra note 60, § 23 (covering preservation in the National Park System).
121. See, e.g., Stephen Stuebner, Private Rights vs. Public Lands: Thousands of Inholdings Create
Conflicts Inside Federal Lands, HIGH COUNTRY NEws, Feb. 16. 1998. available at http://www.hcn.org/
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reflects the same durability dynamic described elsewhere in this Article. As
some scholars have put it:
The federal government's policy has been to ease the political pain of federal
[protected area] designations by granting to existing rights holders a stunning
variety of leaseback, life estate, heritable partial title and similar arrangements
that are and will continue to be an important part of the federal ownership
story for many decades to come.122
The best examples of durable private claims within national parks can be
found within the more recent additions to the national park system. Unlike the
older parks,12 3 which were generally withdrawn from the existing public do-
main and on which there were few prior existing private claims, many of the
newer park units are comprised of lands purchased out of private ownership by
the federal government. For various reasons, federal land acquisition efforts did
not always or even usually result in a single, happy, contiguous unit, owned free
and clear by the federal government. What maps depict simplistically as na-
tional park lands are generally areas of intermixed ownership.12 4 In some
instances, acquisition funds ran out before all the desired land could be pur-
chased; in other cases, lands remained in private hands because the existing land
use was benign and entirely compatible with park purposes. Federal land
assembly efforts, despite a general threshold level of local support (without
which the movement to create a park was unlikely to arise), were often long,
drawn-out battles between park advocates and groups of private landowners,
conducted against the backdrop of the government's possible exercise of its
eminent domain power.12 5
issues/124/3946; NAT'i. PARKS CONSERVATION Ass'N, AMERICA's HERITAGE FOR SALE: A LACK OF FEDERAL
FUNDS THREATENS Loss OF SIGNIFICANT NAnONAL PARKLANDS (2009). Many are surprised to learn, in fact,
that 4.3 million of the 84 million acres encompassed by the boundaries of the national parks are in
actual private ownership. Id. Congress was historically reluctant to buy out pre-existing settlers.
Historian John Ise writes:
Congress usually showed a deep sympathy for the 'poor settlers' who had initiated claims in
the national parks and forests, or perhaps had only squatted on public land, and had not got
patents... . [They] were the object of solicitude from the very time of the establishment of the
park, because they had votes, and also because it was always proper and decorous for a
senator or representative to sympathize with the misfortunes of his constituents.
IsE, supra note 24, at 66-67. Lands that remain in full private ownership, however, are outside the
scope of this analysis; as discussed earlier, the durability of formal property rights is expected in the
American legal system.
122. Sally K. Fairfax et al., The Federal Forests Are Not What They Seem: Formal and Informal
Claims to Federal Lands, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 630, 635 (1999).
123. July 1959 is the date that the National Park Service uses to distinguish between older and newer
parks, a distinction that has several implications for internal NPS policy. See Joseph L. Sax, Buying
Scenery: LandAcquisitions for the National Park Service, 1980 DUKE L.J. 709, 714 (1980).
124. See Fairfax et al., supra note 122, at 634.
125. The National Park Service maintains a remarkable collection of historical materials, including a
number of rich historiographical accounts of the creation and administration of many of the parks. See
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Although the great majority of targeted landowners eventually settled on a
sales price with federal buyers, it was not uncommon for special deals to be
struck with those landowners who wished to remain on their property for some
amount of time. In most such deals, the Park Service acquired fee title to the
parcel but leased it back to the occupants for ten to twenty-five years or perhaps
for the life of the occupant.12 6 The leaseback, of course, would reduce the
purchase price paid by the Park Service.12 7 The Service's policy in this regard
was driven by financial and practical considerations in addition to political ones,
but the end result was a large number of residual private claims on many of the
recently created units of the national park system.12 8
Of course, leasebacks are designed as a transitional arrangement-a way of
softening the blow to those who will be compelled to leave their homes and
move elsewhere while a new national park is created. Yet the National Park
Service has discovered that when the period of transition ends, the leaseholder
does not always leave willingly. Sometimes litigation is necessary to eject
lingering tenants.12 9 Not infrequently, however, the Park Service is more le-
nient, simply allowing tenants to remain past the expiration of the leaseback
agreement.130 This is property that the federal government has already pur-
chased; it goes without saying that the Park Service would never allow a
newcomer to lease land within a national park in order to build a private home.
A similar situation exists on National Forest lands, on which can be found
thousands of private summer cabins. These cabins are the legacy of the Recre-
ation Residence Program, which was launched by the Forest Service in the early
Park Histories Program, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/history/history/parkhistories/
(last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
126. See, e.g., PAUL SADIN, MANAGING A LAND IN MOTION: AN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF POINT REYES
NATIONAL SEASHORE 81 (2007) (describing a congressional plan to offer residents retained rights for the
life of the occupant, the occupant's spouse, or until the occupant's youngest child reached the age of
thirty).
127. As a rule of thumb, the purchase price was reduced by 1% for each year of the leaseback.
Conversation with Denis Garvin, former Deputy Director, National Park Service (Mar. 14, 2013).
128. The land acquisition policies of the Park Service are well described in Sax, supra note 123,
at 711-16. The U.S. government spent nearly $1 billion acquiring national park land between 1965 and
1977, and the practice of offering leasebacks expanded after an internal policy shift within the Park
Service around 1979. See John F. Lambert, Jr., Private Landholdings in the National Parks: Examples
from Yosemite National Park and Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore, 6 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 35, 35-36
(1982). For critiques of the Service's acquisition policies, see, for example, COMPTROLLER GEN., U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CED-80-14, THE FEDERAL DRIVE To ACQUIRE PRIVATE LANDS SHOULD BE
REASSESSED (1979); Steven A. Hemmat, Comment, Parks, People, and Private Property: The National
Park Service and Eminent Domain, 16 ENvn.. L. 935 (1986).
129. See, e.g., Teresa Auch Schultz, Feds File Suit to Evict Couple from Indiana Dunes National
Lakeshore Home, IND. EcON. DIG. (Nov. 5, 2010, 9:50 AM), http://www.indianaeconomicdigest.net/
main.asp?SectionlD=31&SubSectionlD= 135&ArticlelD=56849.
I30. There are countless examples in the archives of the National Park Service. See, e.g., JOAN
ZENZEN, BRIDGING THE PAST: AN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF MINUTE MAN NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK 224
(2010) (describing how, at Minute Man, one notable acquisition resulted in a use and occupancy permit
for a popular local eatery; upon its expiration, the permit was extended by two successive park
superintendents until the owner eventually elected to shut down the restaurant in 1998).
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1900s.13 ' The Program invited citizens to build seasonal cabins within the
National Forests to facilitate recreation and increase the public's use of forest
land. The permits issued by the Service were not leases; were terminable by
the Service under a broad range of circumstances; and required the permit
holder, upon expiration of the permit, to restore the land to its original condi-
tion or, alternatively, to convey title to any permanent improvements to the
United States.' 32 In other words, the Program was premised on the understand-
ing that claimants were not acquiring any sort of permanent interest in National
Forest land.
By the mid-1900s, it had become clear that private residences were occupy-
ing some of the choicest spots within the National Forests and thus depriving
the general public of the enjoyment of these places.'-3 In 1968, the Forest
Service stopped issuing new permits; 3 4 in 1970, the Public Land Law Review
Commission recommended that even existing cabins should be eliminated.3 s
The Forest Service never adopted the Commission's recommendation even
though, as a legal matter, it could easily have done so. The Service's own study
of over 5,000 residences revealed that noncompliance was widespread: a major-
ity of the sampled units had unauthorized improvements (some "cabins" were
now found to be in excess of 3,000 square feet, and many others were being
used as permanent residences, which is explicitly disallowed). 36 Other viola-
tions included nonpayment of use fees, substandard upkeep, and mainte-
nance. 1 To combat these compliance issues, the Service could have simply
phased out the cabins by allowing existing permits to expire without renewal.
More aggressively, it could have terminated thousands of permits for noncompli-
ance with permit conditions. 38
Yet the Forest Service has taken neither of these courses, in part because the
cabin users have had great success in winning congressional sympathy. 39
Indeed, the most pressing issue about these cabins in recent years has not been
whether to allow them to remain, but whether their permit fees are too high.' 4 0
There is no indication that Congress or the Forest Service have any intention of
13 1. See generally Dan Gildor, Note, Location. Location, Location: Forest Service Adininistration of
the Recreation Residence Program, 28 Ecotx;Y L.Q. 993 (2002) (describing the Program and offering
possible reforms).
132. Id. at 1002-05.
133. Id. at 1000-01.
334. Id.
335. Pun. LAND LAw Raivilw COMM'N, supra note 7, at 223-24.
136. Gildor, supra note 131, at 1006.
I37. Id.
138. Id. at 1004-07; see also 36 C.F.R. § 251.60(a)(1)(1)(B) (2013).
139. Gildor, supra note 131, at 1009-13. The permitholders' interest group, National Forest Homeown-
ers (NFH), is formally committed to the durability of their private claims, espousing a policy of "no net
loss" of forest cabins. NFH, Position Statement 1. NATIONAL FoREST HowiOwNEss (Sept. I, 2005),
http://www.nationalforesthomeowners.org/?page= NFHPosition 1.
140. See Phil Taylor, Tester Seeks Fee Relief for National Forest Cabin Owners, LAND Lirruk
(Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/landletter/stories/I059940809: Hannah Northey, House Panel
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removing existing cabins. No new cabins may now be built, but those fortunate
enough to hold permits already will, in all likelihood, retain them for many
years to come.
The foregoing collection of examples, drawn from various domains of public
natural resource management, demonstrate a recurrent pattem: private claims on
public property, once established, are remarkably long-lived and frequently
come to outgrow their original legal parameters. The pattern holds regardless of
which federal agency is involved, regardless of whether the claimant is a mighty
corporation or merely an individual, and regardless of whether the activity
involved is economically substantial or trivial. What accounts for this phenom-
enon? Why is it that, in this important category of state property, private use
rights are so durable? The following pages turn towards an examination of these
questions.
II. EXPLAINING THE NATURE OF PUBLIC PROPERTY
Private property is, without doubt, a cornerstone of American law, and a great
deal of theoretical attention has been devoted to understanding and justifying
the doctrines that underlie private ownership.141 Public property, on the other
hand, has not been so closely examined, and one interested in its study im-
mediately confronts a number of obstacles. The interests and behaviors of
public bodies, for example, are considerably more difficult to understand and to
model than those of private entities.14 2 A great deal of insight into the rules of
private property can be gained by assuming, per the standard law-and-
economics approach, the rationality of private actors in maximizing the utility
of property ownership.14 3 But it is less clear how best to apply a microeconomic
or rational-choice framework to the analysis of public institutions.144 This is
especially true of democratic institutions for which collective action problems
Approves Controversial Hydro, Helium, and Cabin Fee Measures, GREEiNWiRE (Mar. 20, 2013), http:/
www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1059978 190.
141. The literature is too voluminous to reference adequately, but a newcomer to the field can
acquire a good sense for its contours by consulting RomRT C. ELLICKSON, CAROL M. Rosi & BRuU A.
ACKERMAN, PERS'PECTIVES ON PROPiRTY LAw (3d ed. 2002).
142. The seminal work in the difficulties of social choice analysis remains KliNNIETH J. ARROW,
ScuI. CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VAUIS (1951); see also DoNALD P. GRaEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOI.(IlIS 01:
RATIONAL CHOICi: THEORY: A CRITIQUi oi: Aii.ICATIoNS IN POlITICAl. SCIEiNCE (1994).
143. See generally RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE EcoNOMICS ton PRoi':RTY LAW (Kenneth Ayotte &
Henry E. Smith eds., 2011) (a leading collection of articles using economic analysis to explore nu-
merous aspects of property law using economic analysis).
144. This is not to say that heroic efforts have not been made; indeed, a great deal of contemporary
political science is committed to the development of parsimonious economic models of politics. See,
e.g., DAvin R. MAYHEW, CONGRIss: THE Ei.i:c~oRAl. CoNNCTaION (1974); GuioRaou Tsiiwi.is, Viim PIAYIRS:
How POLITICAL INSTITUTIONs WORK (2002). This literature has been decades in the making, however, and
my point is simply that the economic analysis of public institutions is far more complex than a
comparable analysis of private actors.
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are endemic.' 4 5 What are the interests of a democratic body? How are compet-
ing objectives reconciled? Moreover, the character of state-owned property is
likely to depend on the character of the state and the institutions by which it
owns and manages its property.
Nevertheless, some perspective can be gained on the analysis of public
property by glancing at debates about the origins of private property. There has
been some disagreement over the appropriate starting point for theorizing about
the origins of the rules of property. One venerable line of work, following a
pathbreaking essay by Harold Demsetz, begins its analysis by looking towards a
society's transactional environment.' 46 In this view, property rights will emerge
when the costs of establishing them are exceeded by the gains.14 7 Property is
thus a device that emerges more or less spontaneously and pre-politically, from
the "bottom up," to serve societal needs. But another line of theoretical develop-
ment regards the bottom-up account as "naYve" for failing to take into account
the social and political institutions that formalize property rights in "top-down"
fashion.14 8 Here, property is primarily representative of legal entitlements rather
than social expectations,14 9 and the theorist's attention must be focused on the
decision rules employed by the institutions empowered to create or enforce
property-and thus, of course, on whose agreement is required to change the
rules of property.o50 Implicit in the first view is that political institutions will
roughly or eventually reproduce or sanction private ordering; implicit in the
second is that all property rules worthy of the name are ultimately political
creations.
The analysis of public property invites a similar two-front inquiry. On one
hand, the category by definition demands attention to the state and presupposes
governmental rules for its establishment. On the other, the account presented in
this Article clearly emphasizes the demands, interests, and behaviors of private
145. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LoGIc oi Coi.izEcTvi ACTION: Punuc GOODS AND THE THEORY
oF GROUPS (2009) (describing the problem of collective action).
146. Demsetz, supra note 8. For expansions on Demsetz's account, see the essays from the
conference, "The Evolution of Property Rights," held at the Northwestern University School of Law on
April 21-22, 2001, published in 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2002); see also RomiEr C. EiuJCKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE Disiurms (1991); OSTROM, supra note 2; Carol M. Rose,
Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (1985).
147. The costs are usually conceived of in terms of definition, monitoring, and enforcement of
property rights; the benefits include reductions in transaction costs and externalities. See, e.g., Terry L.
Anderson & P. J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J.L. & EcoN.
163 (1975).
148. THRAINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONs 254 (1990).
149. As Jeremy Bentham famously wrote, "Property and law are born together, and die together.
Before laws were made there was no property; take away laws, and property ceases." JEREMY BENTHAM,
THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 111-13 (C. K. Ogden ed., Richard Hildreth trans., Harcourt, Brace & Co.
1931) (1802); see also Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of
Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. Riiv. 117, 117 (2005) (arguing that the Demsetzian-inspired accounts of
the evolution of private property tend to neglect the role of the state in property rights formation).
150. See Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STun.
S421, S427 (2002).
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claimants. The final product-the phenomenon to be explained-is the conse-
quence of the interaction between legal rules, private behavior, and official
behavior. In order to capture this interaction, this Part begins with a historical
account of public land ownership in the United States. This background is
crucial to understanding the peculiar patterns that have arisen in American
public resource management. Following this, the discussion turns to summarize
the interests, ideas, and institutions that presently shape the governance of
public property. Interests and ideas are the bottom-up raw materials of the
democratic process, but the final shape of public policy is dictated by how those
materials are filtered through top-down political and bureaucratic institutions.
A. SOME HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The durability of private claims to public natural resources is in part the
ongoing legacy of early developments in American history. Unlike modern
environmental law, which is of relatively recent vintage, much of public land
and resource law is old.1"' Until roughly the early 1900s, Congress's primary
objectives with respect to the public domain had much more to do with nation
building than with conservation or environmental protection.15 2 Federal policy
encouraged settlement and resource extraction on the public lands, and various
land disposal laws like the Homestead Act transferred public lands into private
ownership nearly as fast as possible.15 3 Where the law wasn't fast enough,
lawlessness was faster; squatters, timber thieves, and countless others took
advantage of the near-total absence of government oversight of the frontier.' 54
The public domain had the character of a vast commons that was rapidly being
appropriated into private ownership.
Slowly, the law changed in response to increasing demands that land be
protected or conserved. Congress sought to keep reserves of oil and coal, to
protect iconic landscapes, and to prevent settlement within western forests and
other noteworthy areas.' 5 But it was impossible to extinguish the powerful idea
that most public lands should remain open to virtually unrestricted public use.
So even as federal officials moved to retain land and to slow the transfer of land
151. See Robert L. Fischman, What is Natural Resources Law?, 78 U. Coto. L. REv. 717, 737-41
(2005) (observing that although environmental law has "shallow roots," natural resources law, by
contrast, is "deeply influence[d]" by "old statutes").
152. See generally GAFs, supra note 32; BENJAMIN HORACE HIBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUHic LAND
Poi.icis (1939).
153. See infra note 156; see also James L. Huffman, The Inevitability of Private Rights in Public
Lands, 65 U. Coi.o. L. Rav. 241, 247-50 (1993).
154. See generally JACOBY, supra note 51.
155. See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 11, at 123-45. Executive withdrawal authority with respect to
forests arose out of the 1891 General Revision Act, which authorized the President to "set apart and
reserve ... any part of the public lands wholly or in part covered with timber or undergrowth."
16 U.S.C. § 471 (1970) (repealed 1976). The lion's share of our current national forests and national
parks are comprised of lands reserved by turn-of-the-century presidents under this statute. The
Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (2012), has served as the basis of many presidential
reservations of national monuments and other protected areas.
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into private hands, they still permitted all manner of public access to lands, and
in quite a durable form. Many of the access rights created in this period survive
today. In some instances, it appears that lawmakers never even gave serious
consideration to how various land uses might come to an end. The assumption
appears to have been that some land uses would be extended in perpetuity. The
pages that follow describe this development in greater detail.
1. Early History
The federal government has always stood in awkward relation to the bulk
ownership of land. As a matter of political philosophy, large-scale public
ownership of any class of productive asset is in some tension with American
political ideals;' 5 6 as a matter of constitutional law, the limited powers assigned
to the federal government do not obviously suggest its present role as the
nation's largest land manager. 57 Yet as this section will explain, it became
politically and practically expedient at the very earliest stages for the federal
government to hold title to vast areas of land.
Centralized land ownership, in the first instance, was a useful instrument
for resolving disputes between the colonies over their awkward imbalance
with respect to land claims on the western frontier.'5" As colonies, Virginia,
New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Georgia had asserted claims to
portions of the immense inner wilderness that lay to the west of the Alleghenies.
The remaining colonies saw these claims as a threat to their status as political
equals in a new confederation. They agreed to set aside their concerns if the
western claims were ceded to the new federal government for the benefit of the
new nation. Thus, Virginia famously agreed to cede its massive land claims to
the federal government in order to induce Maryland to accept the Articles of
Confederation; 59 the others, under similar pressure, eventually ceded their
claims as well.
156. The tension is twofold. First, public ownership is generally disfavored in American political
culture. Second, the federal government in particular was to be a government of strictly limited powers,
and federal land ownership conflicted with understandings of state sovereignty. As historian Paul Gates
notes, "Sovereignty was associated with the ownership of ungranted lands within a state's boundar-
ies . . . ." Paul W. Gates, An Overview ofAnerican Land Policy, 50 AoRIc. HisT. 213, 215 (1976).
157. Of course, neither does the Constitution preclude such a role. It simply does not address in any
great detail the authority of the federal government over lands that it owns, perhaps because its authors
did not foresee the massive land acquisitions that would take place only shortly after its ratification. The
only clauses to speak to the matter are the Enclave Clause and the Property Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I.
§ 8, cl. 17 ("The Congress shall have Power To... exercise exclusive Legislation ... over all Places
purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of
Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings...."); U.S. CONsT. art. IV. § 3
("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States . . . ."). Both clauses, however, have been
given relatively broad readings by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico. 426 U.S. 529
(1976); Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885).
158. Gates, supra note 156, at 214-18.
159. Id. at 214; AKHII. Riii AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTrrUTION: A Bt XiRAiny 271 (2005).
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Partially on account of these early cessions, it was the federal government,
and not the states, that negotiated additional land acquisitions in the West, most
prominently the Louisiana Purchase in 1804.160 When Napoleon offered to sell
the entire Louisiana Territory for a pittance, Thomas Jefferson had little time to
dwell on whatever doubts he had about his constitutional authority to purchase
foreign territory. In the words of historian Richard White, the federal govern-
ment "settled [this] question about the extent of its powers simply by exercising
them."' 6 '
Although the federal government wasted no time in acquiring land, most
were under the assumption that this land would be sold quickly.' 62 Alexander
Hamilton and others successfully advocated for a policy of land disposal for
purposes of repaying the infant nation's war debt,' 6" and land sales became a
large and reliable source of federal revenue.1 6 4 Land sales, it was hoped, would
also serve the nation's defense of its western border by attracting settlers who
would "by their very presence comprise an invincible American army."
Public land law was structured to facilitate the commodification of land. The
Land Act of 1796, building on the earlier Land Ordinance of 1785, established
the land survey system, which required public lands to be surveyed "without
delay" and divided into square townships that could be subdivided into equally
sized square tracts.' 6 6 These tracts were then auctioned off at a minimum price
of two dollars per acre.' 67 A great deal of land was simply handed to states for
160. See generally EvERETtT Somi:RvIi.ii BROWN, THE: CONSTITUTIONAL. HISTORY O: THE LOUISIANA
PURCHASE 1803-1812 (1920); PETER J. KASTOR, THE NATION'S CRUCIHIlE: THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND
THE CREATION 01 AMERICA (2004). Both of these leading historical accounts of the Louisiana Purchase
discuss how issues of federalism shaped and were shaped by the acquisition.
161. RICHARD WHITE, "IT'S YOUR MISFORTUNE AND NONE 01 MY OWN": A HISTORY or THE AMERICAN
WIST 62 (1991).
162. The early cessions by the colonies to the federal government had specified that the ceded lands
were to be "considered as a common fund for the use and benefit of such of the United States as have
become, or shall become members of the confederation or federal alliance of the said States,... and
shall be . . . disposed of for that purpose, and for no other purpose whatsoever." Gates, supra note 156,
at 214 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
212 (1845), the Court was called up to interpret this language and stated:
The object of all the parties to these contracts of cession, was to convert the land into money
for the payment of the debt, and to erect new states over the territory thus ceded; and as soon
as these purposes could be accomplished, the power of the United States over these lands, as
property, was to cease.
Id. at 224. The Court's confident statement of federal objectives has given great encouragement over
the years to various legal challenges against the federal government's ongoing land management,
notwithstanding the fact that subsequent cases underscored the constitutional authority of the federal
government to retain public domain lands in perpetuity.
163. Gates, supra note 156, at 217-18.
164. Land sales represented 7% of federal income in 1811 but fully 48% by 1836. See Gates, supra
note 28, at 37. Land was also granted as payment in kind, for example, military service. See CO(GINS
E A.., supra note 11, at 102.
165. AMAR, supra note 159, at 272.
166. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY oi: AMERICAN LAW 168 (3d ed. 2005).
167. The minimum price was later reduced to $1.25. Id. at 170.
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schools, for colleges and seminaries, and later for railroads.1 6 8 Nonetheless,
"[o]nce land was surveyed, the idea was to dispose of it," and more particularly
"to privatize it, as soon as was humanly possible."I 6 9
The policy of disposal accelerated through the nineteenth century as west-
ward expansion and settlement became national fixations. The Homestead Act
of 1862 is easily the best-known symbol of disposal, but many other laws, now
mostly forgotten, had the same end.o70 There were occasional efforts to with-
hold lands for federal purposes, or at least to distinguish between mundane
farmland and land rich in timber, coal, or minerals.' 7 ' But given the almost
nonexistent federal presence on the frontier, these laws were difficult if not
impossible to enforce.17 2
In fact, although the land survey system suggests an orderly process, the
actual disposition of the public domain was chaotic. The mechanisms that
federal law employed for land disposal were flouted in countless ways. 73
Squatters abounded. So well-known were the numerous ways of circumventing
the terms of the Homestead Act that they reached even the pages of The Little
House on the Prairie.17 4 Coal and timber lands, ostensibly protected by federal
law, were snatched up by fraud or simply denuded by theft.' 75 Sawmills
operated on federal land in Minnesota for eleven years before even a single acre
of timberland was properly sold.' 76 Virtually the entire California Gold Rush
played out on federal lands without any interference by the federal govern-
ment-no attempt was made to enforce public land law, or to capture royalties
from gold production. The army colonel nearest the gold fields, tasked with
evaluating how the federal government might assert its rights, wisely declared,
"[U]pon considering the large extent of the country, the character of the people
engaged, and the small scattered force at my command . .. I resolved not to
168. Such grants drew loud objections from the eastern states, which saw in them a violation of the
"common fund" principle. See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3. How.) 212, 221 (1845); see also Gates,
supra note 156, at 221-22.
169. FRIEDMAN, supra note 166, at 168.
170. See Gates, supra note 156, at 463-530.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 463-94. Gates' account gives the distinct impression that frontier life was a land
scramble, and one in which law played a decidedly limited role.
173. Id.
174. See LAURA INGALLS WI.DER, BY THE SHORES OF SIuvisR LAKH 224-32 (1939) (this book is the fifth
volume in Wilder's Little House series; the passage noted describes attempts at homestead fraud).
175. Coal lands, for example, were to be sold for a higher price than other lands, but the
determination of which lands bore coal was made by the claimant. The Department of the Interior
simply did not have the resources to make an independent assessment, and thus the system saw
widespread abuse. Parts of this story are told in Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865,
868-71 (1999).
176. COChNS ET AL., supra note 11, at 109-15 (noting also the success of transcontinental railroads
in frustrating the federal requirement that granted lands be sold within three years by selling to
affiliates).
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interfere." 7 7 Many federal troops simply deserted to join the gold hunt them-
selves. Later, vast rangeland in the public domain was fenced in by ranchers for
their exclusive use.' 7 8
Arguably, however, federal policy succeeded even if federal law did not. The
West was settled. New states were formed. The national economy grew exponen-
tially. Rather than invest in to-the-letter enforcement of its public land laws,
Congress generally chose to ratify questionable land-grabbing behaviors. Thus
preemption laws were passed from time to time to shore up squatters' title to
federal land, and eventually a prospective law of preemption was passed that
essentially legitimized future squatting. 7 9 Mining laws not only ratified the
claims of previous miners, but also created a prospective "right to mine" on
federal land whereby prospectors could acquire, merely by the barest effort at
development, a property-right good against the federal government.' 80 Some
might see in these ratification efforts only a recognition that the federal govern-
ment was impotent to regulate frontier settlement, but more likely lawmakers
saw that, by and large, national objectives were being accomplished. The only
significant objections to land disposal efforts came from eastern states, which
continually and predictably sought greater remuneration from western land
sales.' 8 ' But despite such objections, a sizeable share of the vast domain of land
that had fallen into federal possession was transferred into private possession in
a relatively short amount of time.
It is important to note that, as a matter of law, there was no doubt about
the strength or validity of the federal government's title to the public domain.
Courts repeatedly underscored that it was federal government's "forbear-
ance"l 8 2 that allowed miners to mine, ranchers to graze, and settlers to settle
apart from the processes required by law. Squatting or other illegal appropria-
tion could only be converted into valid title by an action of Congress. The
strongest claim that could be made apart from congressional action was that the
United States had granted an "implied license, growing out of the custom of
nearly a hundred years, that the public lands of the United States .. . shall be
free to the people who seek to use them."' 83 And an implied license, of course,
may be revoked at will.
Yet time after time in the nineteenth century, rather than revoke the license to
the public lands, the federal government deliberately converted possession into
full-fledged ownership. Private usage matured into private title as Congress
177. Id. at 112 (alteration in original) (quoting THOMAS DONALDSON, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ITS HISTORY
WITH STATISTICS 312-17 (1884)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
178. See Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 522 (1897).
179. See Gates, supra note 156, at 219-48.
180. See 30 U.S.C. § 22 (2012).
181. See Gates, supra note 156.
182. Boggs v. Merced Mining Co., 14 Cal. 279, 374 (1859), appeal dismissed sub nom. Mining Co.
v. Boggs, 70 U.S. 304 (1865).
183. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890).
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allowed. Occupants of the public lands had little reason to fear ejectment,
whether because of hard law, administrative lenience, or simple ignorance on
the part of the federal landlord as to their occupancy. Public property, at least as
regards the public domain, was simply and powerfully regarded as belonging, in
a very immediate and direct sense, to those who needed it, depended on it, and
made use of it. Uninterrupted occupancy was treated as private acquisition by
settlers and eventually by lawmakers as well.
2. The Transition Towards Land Retention
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, federal land law began a long
evolution away from disposal and towards retention of the public domain. A
number of forces were at work, but all derived from the simple fact that the
nation's successful settlement of the West translated directly and inevitably into
resource scarcity. The frontier era was coming to a close.184 There was increas-
ing frustration that federal policies were being thwarted on the public lands,
especially those policies intended to limit speculation in land and concentration
of land ownership. There was increasing recognition that certain lands were
worthy of protection from development. And finally, there was increasing
consensus that certain minerals and commodities should be reserved for federal
purposes.'8 It became more difficult to gain outright title to federal lands.
Instead, as this section will demonstrate, a new pattern emerged. In coal or
mineral lands, settlers could acquire title only to the surface, not the mineral
estate. Other resource users could not obtain title at all, but instead received
permits or licenses to graze sheep or cattle, build and operate hydropower
facilities, or construct summer cabins. Such permits or licenses were generally
long-term; little if any consideration was given to what might happen should
these resource uses one day be deemed inappropriate. The expectation seemed
to be that, although the United States retained the paramount title in public
lands, private uses and occupancies could remain indefinitely.
To be clear, federal land disposal processes continued apace well into the
twentieth century. Homestead claims carried on and vast areas of federal land
remained fully open to entry. New legislation allowed for different settlement
terms as circumstances dictated and tried to incentivize beneficial practices.
The Timber Culture Act,'86 for example, allowed homesteaders to acquire
more acreage if they planted trees in the treeless plains. The Desert Lands Act
184. See FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, The Significance of the Fnniier in American History, in THE
FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HisORY 1, I (1920). Turner begins his famous essay by noting that in 1890, the
Superintendent of the U.S. Census Bureau declared that a frontier line could no longer be said to exist
by virtue of numerous pockets of settlement throughout the West. Id.
185. For books describing these developments, see, for example, HORACE M. ALBRKIHT & MARIAN
AI.1BRIGHT SCHIENCK, CREATING THE NATIONAL PARK SIERvICiE: THE MISSING YEARS (1999); Foss, supra note
56; HAYS, supra note 14; Isli, supra note 24; CHRISTOPHER McGRORY KIvZA, WHO CONTROLS PUBLIC
LANDs? MINING, FoRESTRY, AN) GRAZING POiuins, 1870-1990 (1996); PEiaIER, supra note 57: see also
Gates, supra note 28.
186. Act of June 3, 1878, ch. 151, 20 Stat. 89 (1878).
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allowed claimants to acquire 640 acres (rather than the 160 allowed under the
Homestead Act) in lands too arid to farm, on the condition that the claimants
would irrigate the land.' 8 7 The Stock-Raising Homestead Act granted 640 acres
of surface estate to bona fide ranchers,' 88 and the Timber and Stone Act allowed
entry into lands unfit for farming.' 89
All these laws were intended to sow in the West the seeds of agrarianism on
the model of the small, family-owned farm. But the laws were terribly abused,
and fraudulent land claims came to vastly outnumber legitimate ones. Slowly
but surely, Congress learned that, despite its efforts, western land was being
bought up by speculators and commercial interests. The Desert Lands Act and
the Timber and Stone Act, wrote Marc Reisner, "could not have promoted land
monopoly and corruption more efficiently if they had been expressly designed
for that purpose."' 90 Perhaps 95% of the claims submitted under the Desert
Lands Act were fraudulent.' 9 '
As these abuses were coming to light, so too was the fact that the scenic
treasures of the West were falling into private hands just as quickly as the more
mundane lands. Already in the 1860s, Congress began to debate whether areas
such as Yellowstone and Yosemite should be withdrawn from the public do-
main. John Ise wrote of the creation of Yellowstone National Park in 1872 that:
The reservation of this large tract of over 2 million acres of land-larger
than a couple of the smallest eastern states-with its wealth of timber, game,
grass, water power, and possible minerals barred from all private use, was so
dramatic a departure from the general public land policy of Congress that it
seems almost a miracle.' 92
Yet not long after the first parks, others followed at places like Mesa Verde,
Mount Rainier, and Crater Lake.
Aside from such singular landscapes, the federal government recognized
also that certain natural resources, such as coal and timber, were being rapidly
187. Act of Mar. 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877).
188. Act of Dec. 29, 1916, ch. 9, 39 Stat. 862 (1916).
189. Act of Apr. 30, 1878, ch. 76, 20 Stat. 46 (1878).
190. MARC R:IlsNER, CAI.I.AC Dismiar THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITs DiSAPPEARING WAnR 43 (rev. ed.
1993).
191. See id. at 44.
192. IsEi, supra note 24, at 17. Although Yellowstone was the first national park, eight years earlier
Congress had transferred the Yosemite area to the state of California "upon the express conditions that
the premises shall be held for public use, resort and recreation [and] shall be inalienable for all time."
Act of June 30, 1864, ch. CLXXXIV, 13 Stat. 325 (1864). In a speech to his chamber during the debate,
Senator Trumbull of Illinois had commented that "one or two persons are now claiming [Yosemite] by
virtue of a preemption"; with respect to the as-yet untouched Yellowstone, he continued, "it is possible
that some person may go there and plant himself right across the only path that leads to these wonders,
and charge every man that passes along between the gorges of these mountains a fee of a dollar or five
dollars." See Isli, supra note 24, at 16-17. The national park model had not yet been established, of
course, and it was certainly not obvious that federal retention of property was the answer.
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depleted. There was talk of "timber famine"19 and "coal famine."l9 Salmon
harvests in the Columbia River were a fraction of what they had been just a few
decades before, when Lewis and Clark had written of a river so dense with fish
that one could imagine walking across the mile-wide river on their backs.' 9 5
Resource depletion was in some measure a tragedy of the commons, but it also
reflected the problems inherent in the subsidization of resource extraction that
was implicit in federal land policy. Unregulated access to federal land led
directly to overproduction and ravaging competition.' 9 6 Low prices in timber
caused by this implicit subsidy meant that lumber mills could only profit when
"driven to their utmost capacity of production,"' 9 7 and the timber industry itself
began to seek restrictions on public-lands access for timbering.
The combined effect of these developments was to create an impetus for
federal retention of land and regulation of land access.19 8 Aside from the
national parks, the first serious move to withdraw lands from homestead entry
came in a little noticed provision of an 1891 law. The provision authorized the
President to set apart "any part of the public lands wholly or in part covered
with timber or undergrowth, whether of commercial value or not, as national
forests."' 99 A series of presidents, over the next sixteen years, used that author-
ity to set aside land that today constitutes roughly 80% of the United States'
national forests and a number of national parks. 20 President Teddy Roosevelt,
for whom land and resource issues became a high priority, in 1903 appointed a
Public Lands Commission to assess the difficulties vexing public-lands adminis-
tration. 20 ' The Commission's report in 1905 urged the repeal of a number of
existing laws and advocated public ownership of much of the public domain,
not to stop development, but rather to make it more efficient in the face of
193. WILL.IAM G. RoIunNS, AMERICAN FORESTRY: A HisToRY o NATIONAL, STATE, & PRIvAnT COOPERA-
TION 1 (1985); see also United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 705 (1978) (Justice Rehnquist
noting that "[ifn the mid and late 1800's, many of the forests on the public domain were ravaged and
the fear arose that the forest lands might soon disappear, leaving the United States with a shortage both
of timber and of watersheds with which to encourage stream flows while preventing floods.").
194. Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 868 (1999).
195. WILKINSON, supra note 21, at 184.
196. See WHITE, supra note 161, at 494.
197. RonlnNs, supra note 193, at 6 (quoting 1886 DiVIsIoN FoRESTRY ANN. RE. 149).
198. Former Representative Esch once stated:
Already we have largely lost our heritage as a Nation in the coal, gas, oil, timber and mineral
lands with which we were so bountifully blessed. These are already in private owner-
ship .... We have no right to rob the next generation of its rightful inheritance. We have no
right to transmit to it a natural resource whose ownership in private lands may prove
burdensome and oppressive.
Marc R. Poirier & Jane Hardin, Public Preference and the Relicensing of Hydroelectric Projects,
21 HARV. J. ON Liais. 459, 468 (1984) (quoting 53 CONG. Riic. 1515 app. (1916) (statement of
Rep. Esch)).
199. 16 U.S.C. § 471 (1970) (repealed 1976).
200. CMxINs ET AL.., supra note I1, at 124.
201. P:IER, supra note 57, at 45-53.
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depletion. 2 0 2 The report met with disapproval from various political camps, but
Roosevelt pressed on, relying, for example, on authority provided by the new
1906 Antiquities Act to reserve a number of national monuments.2 0 3
In addition to withdrawing lands from outright settlement, federal law in the
early 1900s began to regulate access to particular resources. Congress imple-
mented a leasing system for oil, natural gas, and coal, always retaining title to
land, and reserving a royalty based on actual production. In 1906, Gifford
Pinchot, the nation's forester in chief, for the first time required a permit and a
fee for grazing on public lands. 2 0 Although these requirements applied only
within the national forest reserves, and it would be nearly thirty years before
they applied to nonforest lands, 2 0 5 this was a major development and a thorn in
the side of the ranching industry, which had long since developed a sense of
entitlement to the rangelands.20 6
By retaining the ultimate ownership of its land in a great many instances, the
federal government was creating a new pattern in which resource users did not
acquire land outright but instead arranged for permission to use public lands for
extended periods. Leases and permits had long terms on their face, but just as
important was the fact that they were commonly renewed. Grazing permits,
for example, were generally issued for a term of ten years and were virtually
always renewed.20 7 Furthermore, in the allocation of initial grazing allotments,
the federal government gave some preference to those who had already been
using the land to be allotted.2 08 Interestingly, the allocation of grazing rights
also took into account private land ownership, favoring those who owned "base
ranch" land adjacent to federally owned range.2 0 9 This policy fueled the private
claimants' sense of proprietorship over the grazing resource; the renewal of
federal grazing rights attached to base lands was taken to be so nearly certain
that banks, when offering mortgages for ranches, began to collateralize the
added value attributable to federal grazing permits.2 10 Thus, despite assiduous
efforts to refrain from granting formal property rights to grazing, federal law
created an allocation scheme to a federal resource that did not easily lend itself
to a reduction in or termination of resource use.2 11 As we have already seen in
Part I, grazing rights have been exceedingly durable across the West right up
202. Id.; see also WHITE, supra note 161, at 400.
203. PElTER, supra note 57, at 53.
204. WILKINSON, supra note 21, at 91.
205. Id. at 93.
206. Id. at 82-94.
207. PEFFER, supra note 57, at 229; see also Foss, supra note 56, at 61-72.
208. Foss, supra note 56, at 63-66; see also LEIGH RAYMOND, PRIVATE RIGHTS IN PUBLic RESOURCES:
EQuITY AND PRoPERTY ALLOCATION IN MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 109-52 (2003).
209. RAYMOND, supra note 208, at 109-52; see also CALEF, supra note 56, at 62-70.
210. See supra text accompanying note 61; WILKINSON, supra note 21, at 107-08.
211. See PuB. LAND LAw RIvIuw COMM'N, supra note 7, at 106 ("[T]he pattern of livestock ranching,
which was dependent upon public land grazing when the [Taylor Grazing] Act was passed, has been
held constant.. . . Forest Service policies have [also] resulted broadly in the continuation of ranching
patterns that existed at the time permits for grazing in national forests were first issued in 1905.").
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until the present day, despite decades of data suggesting that the bulk of federal
rangeland has been dangerously overgrazed.
A similar point could be made about other uses of the public lands, such as
hydroelectric dams. Although hydropower came into its own in an era in which
private power providers were competing with municipalities, what became
evident in any event was that the private right to public lands for dam purposes
was a very long-term one. "[T]he present licensee," wrote several commenta-
tors, "has the equivalent of a perpetual grant if it wants one."22 Of course, a
dam is a permanent structure, and no commercial entity would build one
without a secure long-term arrangement for the use of land. Nonetheless, from
the vantage point of the twenty-first century, when many dams are being
removed, it is intriguing to note that lawmakers did not appear to consider the
possibility of dam removal.2 14 The clear assumption was that dams would
remain in virtual perpetuity.
Thus, although federal law tilted towards retention of the western public
domain lands, the dominant ideas concerning the appropriate use of public lands
still clearly favored private users, who succeeded in acquiring long-term access
rights to public lands. Already this subcategory of public property-that is, the
federally owned lands and resources of the West-was taking on a particular
character: private rights to such property, it was clear, would be fixtures not
easily removed.
B. THE MODERN ERA
The model of public-lands management that came into focus during the late
1800s and early 1900s was one animated primarily by the idea of open access.
In this model, public property is kept open for use by private parties as much as
practically possible; the right to use public land is allocated roughly on a
first-come, first-served basis, in accordance with the principle of prior appropria-
tion.2 15 The role envisioned for government is quite limited, and consists
primarily of zoning public lands for particular uses and overseeing the prior
appropriation process. 2 16 The open-access model, or something quite near it,
212. See WILKINSON, supra note 21, at 75-82.
213. Poirier & Hardin, supra note 198, at 476.
214. The seminal legislation for federal hydropower regulation, the Federal Power Act of 1920, does
not discuss dam removal at all. The only provisions in the vicinity, in fact. are those that deal with the
federal government's authority to take over a licensee's hydropower facility. See 4 Cx(iINS &
GLICKSMAN, supra note 38, § 37:15.
215. Although the prior appropriation principle is most often associated with water law in the
western states, it is much more pervasive than that; it is a "foundational principle of property law."
A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?. 76 N.D. L. Ri:v. 881, 885 (2000).
As we have already seen, the laws of western settlement. from mining to land preemption, presupposed
the applicability of prior appropriation.
216. Thus government designates certain lands as off-limits for certain activities (as with the process
of land withdrawal) and establishes rules and modes of dispute resolution to serve the appropriative
process. See, e.g., The General Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-49 (2012) (defining, for example,
lands open for purchase, locators' rights, succession, and delinquency).
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very much survives today; its key elements are evident in the management of
most public parks (including the national parks) and other public lands as
well.2 17 For proponents of this model, breach of the government's duties with
respect to the management of public property would be epitomized by unjusti-
fied land closure, restriction, or withdrawal, because the land belongs to the
people and ought to be held open for public use as much as possible.2 1 1
The last half-century, however, has brought a number of important changes to
public-lands management. The environmental and conservation movements
have grown exponentially and now represent important and enduring political
constituencies, along with the burgeoning number of recreational users of
federal lands.2 9 There have been dramatic revisions to federal law in service of
environmental and conservationist goals, including in the area of public land
management.2 20 Virtually every major natural resource law has been the subject
of a serious reform effort,2 2 ' and federal land management agencies today are
large, thoroughly professionalized operations.
This broad transition has brought with it a new model of public-lands
management. According to this model, government manages public property as
might a proprietor: by protecting assets against deterioration, and by maximiz-
ing the revenue stream that may be obtained from the use of public resources.
The elements of this proprietary model include highly professionalized and
efficient resource management by a government agency, and access allocation
on the basis of competition and under terms that ensure the long-term protection
of state assets. Thus the model envisions quite a different relationship between
federal agencies and commodity interests than has historically existed: resource
production on federal land, though still substantial, is highly regulated; extrac-
tive industries still succeed in gaining access to public lands, but do so on far
more restrictive terms. A number of federal laws require the payment of "fair
market value" for various forms of resource access, imagining that federal land
217. 1 GtioRGE CAMERON C(x;IlNs & Rotiir L. GiLICKSMAN, Putiic NATURA RtisouRcils LAW § 1:23
(2d ed. 2013) (noting that "[s]ome public resources-such as recreation, hardrock minerals, and
wildlife-essentially are free to those who pursue, locate, or capture them. Other resource benefits-
such as admission to national parks and charges for grazing forage-are available for token fees").
218. For a contemporary defense of some of the central aspects of open access, see generally
Andrew P. Morriss, Roger E. Meiners & Andrew Dorchak. Homesteading Rock: A Defense of Free
Access Under the General Mining Law of 1872. 34 ENVTt.. L. 745 (2004).
219. See generally RICHARD J. LAZARUS, Tm MAKIN; or ENVIRONMENAJ. LAw (2004) (providing a
comprehensive history of the development of environmental law, describing in particular how the
resilience of the environmental community has prevented retrenchment of key environmental policies).
With respect to the rapid growth of recreation on the public lands, see Laitos & Carr, supra note 40.
220. Probably the most important new statutes, on account of their thoroughgoing impact on land
management practices, are the Endangered Species Act of 1973. Pub. L No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884, and
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, Pub. L. No.91-190, 83 Stat. 852.
221. For examples, see the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-87, 91 Stat. 445; National Forest Management Act of 1976. Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949;
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743; and Federal Coal
Leasing Amendments Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-377. 90 Stat. 1083 .
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can be compared with private land on the broader market.222 Many resources
are sold only via competitive bidding, and only after the federal agency has
undertaken a rigorous evaluation of the comparative value of other land uses.2 23
In many cases, the law clearly envisions arms-length transactions between
agencies and businesses, and far from ratifying the illegal appropriation of
federal property, the government now often punishes it-taking action against
trespassers and invoking criminal law for theft of state property. 2 2 4 The public
interest in the land is vindicated not by open access, but by returns to the public
coffers and the preservation and efficient management of important economic
and ecological resources. Breaches of the state's duties under the proprietary
model are epitomized by below-value grants of access, agency capture by
commercial interests, and resource degradation on account of corporate abuse,
because in such instances the state fails in its obligation to steward the resource
to maximize long-run benefits to the entire population.2 25
Under the open-access model, the phenomenon at the heart of this Article-
the durability of private claims to public property-is not particularly troubling.
Within this paradigm, a claimant's right to access a public resource generally
turns on the priority of their appropriation of the resource, determined on a
first-in-time basis; government limitations on the duration of private claims are
generally disfavored. 2 26 The proprietary model, on the other hand, is distinctly
in tension with the durability phenomenon. This is not because grandfathering
or the privileging of existing claimants is always improper on this view, but
222. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1) (2012) (requiring that oil and gas leases on the Outer
Continental Shelf are sold by competitive bid and receive fair market value); 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(9)
(2006) (declaring that the United States should receive "fair market value of the use of the public lands
and their resources unless otherwise provided for by statute"); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1761-1765 (2006)
(requiring payment of fair market value for a rights-of-way across public lands); 43 C.F.R. § 3923.10
(stating that the BLM will not accept bids on oil shale leases below fair market value); see also
I CoaGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 217 (describing a trend "in the direction of a fair market value
standard for sales or grants of commodity public natural resources"); Rontiser H. NiiSON, THE MAKING
oi Fmi:RAL CoAL PoIcy 192 (1983) (describing a shift in federal coal leasing practice towards a fair
market value standard).
Of course, the federal government is not a typical landowner, and it is difficult to forge policy
demanding fair market value when resource markets are so distorted by massive state ownership. As
George C. Coggins has written, "Fair market value seems largely a meaningless abstraction in the
absence of a fair market. Where one owner has half of the land, market forces, such as they are, will not
operate freely." George Cameron Coggins & Margaret Lindeberg-Johnson, The Law of Public Range-
land Management II: The Commons and the Taylor Act, 13 ENvrt. L. 1, 75 (1982).
223. A number of federal environmental laws require the careful examination of alternatives, most
notably NEPA (supra note 220); see 2 COXGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 43, § 17:44.
224. See, e.g., United States v. McPhilomy, 270 F.3d 1302 (10th Cir. 2001) (upholding a criminal
conviction for theft of government property after defendants removed common varieties of stone from a
mining claim).
225. Thus the class of beneficiaries here is perhaps broader than under the open-access model, which
principally benefits those able to make physical use of public lands.
226. This is most visible in the right-to-mine approach of the General Mining Law, supra note 216,
and the initial allocation of grazing rights under the Taylor Grazing Act, supra note 58, but as a
background principle, it runs throughout a great deal of resource law and has historically been the
default approach.
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because the failure of public land managers to enforce limitations on claims
may signal lost revenue opportunities, a failure to negotiate at arms length, or
undesirable resource degradation.
Given the ascendance of the proprietary model, why do private claims remain
so durable? There are several reasons. First, the proprietary model has only
been partially implemented. In some areas of public resource policy, it has been
avoided altogether; 227 in others, it remains a work in progress. 2 2 8 Even a
cursory examination of the rhetoric of public-lands debates makes clear that
the idea of free private access to public lands remains very prevalent indeed
among a number of constituencies, from commodity producers to organized
recreational interests.229 Moreover, many users of public lands derive a number
of benefits from a scheme that combines public land ownership with durable
private claims. For them, this arrangement is in many respects preferable to
outright private resource ownership, because state ownership frees private users
from some of the duties associated with permanent land ownership. Private
claimants generally pay no property taxes (since the federal government retains
land title)230 and often face less ongoing liability for the environmental effects
of their projects than would be entailed by fee-simple ownership, 23' and regula-
tion of resource access can also help certain categories of users solidify their
position as against other possible claimants.23 2 Thus, resource users themselves,
we can be confident, exert pressure on legislators and agency personnel to adopt
227. As noted earlier, some public-lands management patterns still follow the open-access model, es-
pecially as regards recreation, wildlife, and hardrock mineral development. See 1 COGGINs & GLICKS-
MAN, supra note 217, § 1:23.
228. The fair market value policy declared in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, for
example, is one of several general statements of policy that "shall become effective only as specific
statutory authority ... is enacted." 43 U.S.C. § 1701(b) (2006). It has not been implemented even in the
BLM's principal resource program, rangeland management. See Coggins & Lindeberg-Johnson, supra
note 222, at 71-75.
229. See, e.g., John Barrasso & Kevin McCarthy, Editorial, Congress Should Free Public Lands For
Locals, CQ Roit CAL. (May 31, 2011), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/56_130/Barrasso-McCarthy-
Congress-Should-Free-Public-Land-for-Locals-206039- 1.html (promoting Wilderness and Roadless Area
Release Act).
230. This is not because of federal immunity from state taxation; states may tax, for example,
a mining claimant's interest on federal land. Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S. 762, 765-66 (1876); see also
COGGINS ET AL., supra note 11, at 158-59. But the valuation of less-than-fee interests poses enough of a
practical challenge that states generally do not do so. LESHY, supra note 22, at 266.
231. Under some environmental laws, however, liability for environmental damage can extend
beyond the landowner to encompass a number of other parties. The obvious example is the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Contamination, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675,
but many other laws have the same effect. See, e.g., 4 COGGINs & GLICKSMAN, supra note 38, § 42:33
(describing federal mining regulations).
232. More generally, scholars have pointed out that corporations sometimes seek regulation in order
to erect barriers to entry that give them market power. This line of work is most commonly traced to
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971); see also
Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & EcON. 211 (1976) (explaining
how small interest groups, like business associations, can disproportionately wield their lobbying power
to encourage government regulation protecting their established economic position).
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and maintain policies and practices that protect existing claims.2 33
But perhaps the most important factor underlying the durability of private
claims to public property has to do with the awkward fit between the task of
public land management and the political institutions charged with doing so.
Consider, in the abstract, the institutional setting in which private claims to
public natural resources are administrated. Each of the federal land management
agencies is responsible for millions of acres of land, yet is endowed with a
limited budget that varies with changing political winds.23 4 Monitoring the
activities of private land users is exceedingly costly.23 5 Each agency, to some
degree, must rely on other claimants or the general public for notice of claim
violations, 236 and depending on the structure of agency oversight, agency of-
ficials may have little to no incentive to enforce the limits of private claims. 2 37
It is no surprise, in such an environment, that many private claims come to
exceed their original parameters or survive adverse changes in policy. For the
sake of comparison, contrast this circumstance with a private landholder sur-
rounded by other private landholders. Even without any legal action, each
landholder's claim is likely to be robustly contained by adjacent landowners,
each of whom must monitor only his or her own property and has a direct
incentive to do so in order to maintain his or her property interests.
There are, of course, actors within American society who would prefer that
claims on public lands be kept within their legal parameters, just as a private
landowner would prefer that neighbors remain within theirs. But the costs of
activating the governmental mechanisms available to remedy a transgression are
much higher in the former case than the latter. The costs of monitoring remote
233. In fact, for at least one generation of political scientists during the middle of the twentieth
century, the federal land management agencies epitomized the phenomenon of agency "capture" by
private interests. See PAuL J. CULHANE, Puneic LANDS PoLtITiCs: INTEREsT GRouP INFLUENCE ON THEI FoREST
SIERVIClE AND TH BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT (1981); Foss, supra note 56; see also Michael C.
Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why "Multiple Use" Failed, 18 HARv. ENvTI..
L. Ruiv. 405, 407 (1994) (arguing that "congressional endorsement of multiple use has created the
archetypal 'special interest' legislation," leading to agency capitulation to demands from stockmen's
associations, timber mills, and other industry groups).
234. The House of Representatives' proposed budget for the Department of the Interior for fiscal
year 2014, for example, reduces spending on natural resources programs by 14%. With a Few
Exceptions, Cupboard is Bare in House Money Bill, Pun. LANDs Niews Bui.L. (Res. Publ'g Co.,
Arlington, Va.), July 29, 2013, at 1; see also KIYZA, supra note 185, at 1, at 115 (detailing some of the
staffing and funding limitations historically imposed on programs inside the Department of the
Interior).
235. See Eric Biber, The Problem of Environmental Monitoring, 83 U. Coi.o. L. Ri~v. 1, 40 (2011).
Although this article's general focus is the monitoring of ambient conditions, similar dynamics-
especially with respect to the cost of monitoring-arise in the context of public land use.
236. Aaron Richard Olsen, The Value of Knowing: Public Lands Monitoring by Non-Agency
Groups (June 2013) (unpublished M.S. thesis, University of Montana), available at http://scholarwork-
s.umt.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=2124&context=etd.
237. In conversations with national park officials, for example, I have learned that some park
superintendents will allow private claimants to remain on public lands beyond the expiration of their
claim, simply to avoid a confrontation. This is especially likely if their term of service is nearing its
end, so that the problem can be pushed off to their successor. Interview records on file with author.
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public lands are higher; the assertion of a legal claim must involve an intermedi-
ary (namely, the land management agency); and the legal doctrines involved in
resolving the dispute are far less availing (standing, agency discretion, and so
forth). 3 Furthermore, these same legal channels and mechanisms are available
to those who, like the claimholder herself, hold opposing ideas about the
propriety of private use rights on public lands. And as the previous section made
clear, there are widely shared ideas about public lands that would tend to lend
support to the expansion or extension of private claims to public resources.
One can see many of these dynamics at work in a recent, highly publicized
conflict involving the Point Reyes National Seashore near San Francisco,
California. As the land for the Seashore was being assembled in the 1960s and
1970s, the National Park Service agreed in 1972 to allow an oyster farm to
continue operating for forty more years in an area that was shortly thereafter
designated by Congress as "potential wilderness." 24 0 Congress apparently in-
tended, upon the expiration of the nonconforming use, for the area to revert to
formal wilderness status under the terms of the Wilderness Act.2 4' In 2004,
eight years before the anticipated 2012 expiration of the farm's permit, the
owner sold the farm to another operator who had full knowledge of the
upcoming reversion.24 2 Undeterred, the new owner immediately began lobbying
to extend the operating permit and managed to win the support of California
Senator Dianne Feinstein, who persuaded Congress in 2009 to pass an appropria-
tions rider allowing, but not requiring, the Interior Secretary to extend the
farm's permit for an additional ten years.-43 This legislation triggered a fierce
public dispute between wilderness advocates, on the one hand, and small
business proponents and other supporters of the oyster farm on the other.
After a protracted and acrimonious review, the Secretary eventually declined to
extend the permit, leading to even greater acrimony and a series of lawsuits that
remain mired in appeals as of the time of this Article's publication.2 45
238. These doctrines are canvassed in C(xGINS i T Al..supra note I1, at 206-44.
239. Leigh Raymond has argued convincingly that many people hold a default preference in favor of
the continuation of existing legal entitlements. See RAymoNo, supra note 208. Raymond has linked this
widely held preference to the empirical fact that de facto possession of some common resources
routinely translates into a claim for legal ownership likely to be honored by the state. See Leigh
Raymond, The Emerging Revolution in Emissions Trading Policy, in GRIITNHOusi GovIERNANCI:: Ain)I)RIsS-
IN(i CIMATI CHANGE IN AMERICA 101, 105 (Barry G. Rabe ed., 2010); see also Thomas Merrill,
Accession and Original Ownership, I J. Li:GAI. ANALvsis 459 (2009) (suggesting that accession may be
a more efficient means of establishing original ownership of property than first possession).
240. Nell Green Nylen et al., Will the Wilderness Act Be Diluted in Drakes Estero?, 39 Ecoi.x;y L.
CURRENTs 46. 46-48 (2012).
241. Timothy Babalis, Restoring the Past: Environmental History and Oysters at Point Reyes
National Seashore, 28 THi; GIoRai WRIGHT F. 199, 202 (2011).
242. Nylen et al., supra note 240, at 48.
243. Id.
244. Felicity Barringer, A Park, an Oyster Farm and Science, N.Y. Timis GIEIN BI (i (Mar. 24,
2011, 8:30 AM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/24/a-park-an-oyster-farm-and-science/.
245. Jeremy P. Jacobs, Calif Oyster Farm Wants Court to Reconsider Its Decision to Side with
Interior on Lease Dispute, GRITINwIRI: (Oct. 21. 2013). http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2013/10/21/
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Although in this case, land managers did in fact seek to allow a private claim
to expire, note the tremendous obstacles they have encountered. They have
faced political opposition strong enough to evoke congressional action, several
legal challenges, and severe public criticism-to say nothing of the enormous
expenditure of resources that has been required to justify the initial decision and
defend against subsequent legal challenges. Notice also the apparent confidence
of the farm's purchaser that extension of the claim was possible, evident not
only in the initial purchase of the farm, but also in the subsequent expenditure
of time and money in lobbying efforts.
In sum, in the typical private-ownership situation, property claims are cab-
ined and confined by other private rights, adjacent in place and/or time. This is
not to say, of course, that private entities do not ever allow other property rights
to spill over into their own,2 or that government officials never apply counter-
pressure to private claimants; 2 4 7 rather, it is simply to say that in the context of
private ownership, invoking the legal system to maintain the integrity of one's
property right is cleaner, easier, and more straightforward than for those oppos-
ing the extension or expansion of private claims to public property. And the
state itself, as the manager of property, is likely to lack the institutional capacity
or incentive to protect against claim expansion with the same rigor as a typical
private landowner.
The consequence is that private claims to state property are rendered quite
durable on account of the situation of the institutions that administer them.
Despite many important changes in natural resources law, and many discontinui-
ties with the past, it is still the case that natural resource law protects and
extends existing claims to a remarkable degree. The fundamental interests,
ideas, and institutions that shaped the history of public land ownership in the
United States still exert influence today, such that a motivated private claimant
to federal public resources is remarkably well positioned as against newer
claimants and stands a reasonably good chance of extending the claim beyond
its strict legal parameters.
III. IMPLICATIONS
Thus far, this Article has described the durability of private claims to public
property and established some possible reasons for it, both historical and
institutional. It remains to discuss the significance of this phenomenon. There
are important implications for property scholars as well as for public law and
stories/1059989126; Emily Yehle, Despite Setback, Calif Oyster Farm Vows to Keep Fighting to Stay
Open, GREENWIRE (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1059989126.
246. The common law tenancy-at-sufferance, for example, arises when a property owner allows a
tenant to holdover after the expiration of a lease.
247. A famous example involves the first chief of the National Park Service, Stephen Mather, who
required the destruction of a sawmill in Glacier National Park after it had served its purpose in
providing timber needed for the construction of park facilities. See COGGINs ET AL.., supra note I1,
at 133-34.
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policy.
In recent years, scholars have devoted increasing attention to the emergence
and development of private property rights.24 8 Less attention, however, has been
devoted to understanding public ownership. 249 Even studies of property rights
in the natural resources of the American West tend to emphasize the emergence
of private rights rather than the oddity of widespread public land ownership in a
political culture otherwise suspicious of public ownership.2 50
The durability of private claims to public lands provides an important clue to
the broad acceptance and stability of public land ownership. One might think
that industries dependent on resource extraction would have energetically re-
sisted federal land retention, unequivocally endorsing instead the continued
transfer of the public domain into private hands. But these industries rapidly
accommodated themselves to large-scale public land ownership. Over time, the
federal government's management of public lands actually helped existing
resource users to increase their control over the resources that remained in the
public domain, rather than diminish it. This is because public regulation of land
access erected barriers to entry that secured existing claimants' hold on their
preferred resources,251 and public ownership spared these claimants the need for
capital outlays for the purchase of property.252 Regulatory limitations on re-
source use brought to an end the cycles of destructive competition that periodi-
cally threatened to bring extractive industries to their knees.2 53 Federal
management also helped put an end to bitter fights between different user
groups, such as the fierce Range Wars that pitted ranchers against sheepherders
across the Great Plains.25 4 But all of these benefits could only be realized if they
rested atop a foundation of a durable legal claim to a publicly owned resource.
Crucial commercial constituencies, we may be quite sure, would not have
supported federal land control nearly as quickly without assurances of the
248. See, e.g., EiLICKSON, supra note 146; OSTROM, supra note 2; Anderson & Hill, supra note 147;
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Evolution of Private and Open Access Property, 10 THEO-
RriCAL INQ. L. 77 (2009); Demsetz supra note 8; James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin
of Property Rights, 95 CORNi L. Riiv. 139 (2009); Levmore, supra note 150; Rose, supra note 146;
Wyman, supra note 149.
249. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
250. E.g., Anderson & Hill, supra note 147.
25 1. The scheme of rangeland allocation adopted by the Taylor Grazing Act, for example, made it
exceedingly unlikely that newcomers to ranching would succeed in obtaining access to public lands
previously claimed by existing ranchers. See CALEF, supra note 56, at 62-66.
252. Overindebtedness was a perennial problem in the development of the West, and one that led to
occasional regional crises. Many settlers had to mortgage land in order to purchase it, starting a cycle of
fiscal instability. See, e.g., WHrm, supra note 161, at 260-63.
253. HAYS, supra note 14, at 49-55 (describing the deterioration of the public range that occurred as
a result of free access and overgrazing); WHtmI, supra note 161, at 408-09 (affirming that many large
stock raisers "welcomed the chance to end unregulated competition for land and to gain some legally
defensible rights," and then telling a similar story with respect to timber producers on the public forests,
noting that federal timber restrictions "seemed to offer an opportunity to overcome the industry's
problem of chronic overproduction").
254. WILKINSON, supra note 21, at 85-87.
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long-term security of their claims, in both law and administration.2 55 As in so
many other areas of regulation, then, the onset of bureaucratic management was
undergirded by a coalition of strange bedfellows: resource users themselves
were willing to join with conservationists and their ilk to support public
resource ownership and management.
This pattern continues today. Although stakeholders complain unceasingly
about deficiencies in the various resource laws, resource user groups generally
have learned that it is possible to thrive under a scheme of private access to
publicly managed lands-provided, again, that their claims are durable. Commod-
ity interests are not generally among those calling for an end to federal land
ownership. 2 5 7 Most hardrock mining firms, for example, not only content
themselves with a mining law that is over a century old, but do not even avail
themselves of the opportunity to gain fee title to their mining claims. 25 8 Coal
mining companies acceded to legal reforms that theoretically exposed them to
greater competition because the coal leasing process created by these reforms
actually secured the stable expansion of their existing operations.2 59 The durabil-
ity of private claims to public lands, therefore, helps explain the extent of public
land ownership in the American system.
What are the implications for law and policy? In any given instance, of
course, the legal and administrative decisions that render private claims to
public resources so durable may be eminently justifiable. Grandfathering and
renewing existing claims, aside from benefiting the claimants themselves, may
help accomplish federal land-use goals, or may simply amount to a political
concession necessary to the achievement of some overarching objective. More-
over, a recognized pattern of support for private claimants-a de facto rebut-
table presumption in favor of claim renewal-may help encourage additional
255. Thus, for example, not only did the Taylor Grazing Act inscribe in law a preference for existing
permittees, it also created Grazing Advisory Boards, comprised of ranchers themselves, which were
responsible for managing the local range allocation process. See KIYZA. supra note 185, at 113-14.
256. Bruce Yandle calls such coalitions "bootleggers and Baptists" and depicts them as a crucial
precursor to regulatory development. See BRUCI YANItli, THE POLITICAL LIMITs oi ENVIRONMENTAl.
Riusu.AroN: TRACKING THE UNICORN 24 (1989). In the natural-resources context. Richard White de-
scribes how Gifford Pinchot helped expand federal land management by "dividing potential opponents
of regulation and winning over established economic interests." WHITE, supra note 161. at 407-08.
Large economic interests "tended to support the growing trend toward federal management." Id.
257. The leading voices calling for an end to federal ownership do not generally promote privatiza-
tion but rather a transfer of federal lands to state and local governments. See, e.g., Michelle Merlin,
Utah Lawmaker Drives Modern Sagebrush Rebellion, GRaI;INwIRE (June 17, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/
greenwire/stories/1059982962.
258. The General Mining Law of 1872, supra note 22, allows mining claimants to patent their
claims and acquire title to land. 30 U.S.C. § 29 (2012). Although a moratorium has now been imposed
on patenting claims, see supra note 22, mining companies already had abandoned the practice in most
circumstances, because the unpatented mining claim gave them everything they needed. See LESHY.
supra note 22, at 266-67.
259. See supra section I.B.2.
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private investment in public resource development.2 0 One suspects that more
than a few conflicts between federal officials and local users of public lands are
averted by federal officials' respect for private claims, and that federal agencies
would suffer reputational damage-and perhaps even legislative reprisals-if
they were to make a practice of denying lease or permit renewals on question-
able grounds.2 '
These are deeply important considerations, especially in light of the eco-
nomic importance of resource development on the public lands.2 6 2 But a
legislative and administrative environment in which private claims frequently
swell beyond their initial parameters can also yield some significant problems.
First, many of the most hotly disputed private activities on federal lands are
associated with serious environmental harms. Undue deference to existing
claimants can therefore result in prolonged environmental degradation.2 ' This
is not an insignificant point in light of the standard assumption among environ-
mentalists that federal ownership of the public lands is superior, as a matter of
environmental policy, to privatization of those lands. Of course, by the same
token, the durability of environmentally beneficial activities would cut in the
opposite direction, but unfortunately the lion's share of private claims to public
lands involve activities that tend to degrade the land rather than conserve
260. Firms dependent on natural resources often cite changes in federal policy as a leading in-
vestment risk. See, e.g., Opportunities and Challenges Associated with America's Natural Gas Re-
sources: Hearing Before the S. Comn. on Energy & Natural Res., 113th Cong. 6-10 (2013) (statement
of Ross Eisenberg, Vice President of Energy and Resources Policy, National Association of Manufactur-
ers), available at http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?Fileid=cl283c8b-8732-
4975-867e-e4dc73a0f672.
261. Attempts by federal agencies to terminate private claims, though uncommon, tend to trigger
lengthy legal battles. See, e.g., United States v. Estate of Hage, No. 2:07-CV-01 154-RCJ, 2013 WL
2295696 (D. Nev. May 24, 2013) (describing an over twenty-year dispute between the government and
a rancher over a terminated grazing permit); BLM, Nev. Rancher in Dispute Over Cattle, GRaIliNwIR:
(Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1059985545 (describing a fifteen-year legal
battle over a BLM order to end grazing within an endangered species habitat); Jayni Foley Hein, Of
Mollusks and Men: The Wilderness Act and Drakes Bay Oyster Company, THE BIlRKIti1Y B (xi (Jan. 4,
2013), http://blogs.berkeley.edu/2013/01/04/of-molIusks-and-men-the-wilderness-act-and-drakes-bay-
oyster-company (describing a lengthy dispute concerning the Department of the Interior's refusal to
renew a lease for an oyster farm in an area that would otherwise revert to federally designated
wilderness upon its expiration).
262. See generally U.S. DEi'T O THE INTERIOR. THiE Dia'AHTMIENT 01: THE INTERIOR's EcoNOMIC
CONTRIBUTIONS (2011), available at http://www.doi.gov/ppa/upload/DOI-Econ-Report-6-21-2011.pdf
(summarizing the economic impacts of many public land activities by using economic contribution
analysis to measure the impact of the Department of the Interior on the economy and finding that the
Department supported over 2 million jobs and approximately $363 billion in economic activity in
2010). The total economic import of the federal public lands is larger than indicated by this report
because it does not include the economic contributions of the national forests, which are managed by
the Department of Agriculture.
263. This is not only true of resource extraction-mining, oil and gas drilling. grazing, and so
forth-but also, increasingly, of recreational activities involving motorized vehicles.
264. Precisely this complaint is levied against federal land managers in scores of instances. Oppo-
nents of cattle grazing on the public lands, for example. argue that gratuitous extensions of grazing
permits-extensions not required by law-have not only prevented the restoration of rangeland health,
but exacerbated a bad situation. See DoNAHUE. supra note 62.
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265environmental amenities and ecological assets.
Second, the durability of private claims to public resources presents a prob-
lem of fair dealing. The federal government acts as the steward or trustee of the
public lands on behalf of the American people,2 66 and most citizens would
probably endorse some rough principle of equality in public resource allocation.
Yet the analysis presented in this Article suggests that federal land managers
tend to favor parties holding existing claims at the expense of those who might
assert new ones. To be sure, any grant of access to a public resource, however
allocated, necessarily bestows a priority right for the duration of the claim. But
it need not carry with it an indefinite right to the renewal of that claim or to its
preservation (via grandfathering) after new claims of the same type cease to be
granted. The history of federal natural resource administration, with its recur-
rent episodes of resource domination by incumbents, implies that resource
regimes tend to be mastered and manipulated by existing claimants and that
vigilance is demanded of policymakers who would maintain even a weak form
of equal access.26 7 Certainly, legacy interests will frequently have strong and
meritorious claims to continued access to resources on which they have long
relied, and it is not the job of resource gatekeepers to meddle with an industry's
competitive structure by favoring new entrants for their own sake. Nonetheless,
scholars know all too well the capacity of market actors to capture regulatory
agencies for the purposes of maintaining market power, and there is no reason
to suppose that resource management agencies should be immune from such
efforts.2 68
Finally, this analysis suggests that the federal government faces a systematic
disadvantage in its bargaining with private claimants to natural resources. This
manifests itself in several ways. As described in Part II, federal resource policy
has shifted away from the open-access model and towards a proprietary model
marked by competition among claimants and the recovery of fair market value
for commodity resources. The durability phenomenon undermines this shift,
because federal law generally does not take account of the benefits that a
265. It is, alas, not even close. The main categories of private claims all involve resource extraction
and carry significant environmental burdens: mining claims, leases for energy resources, grazing
claims, use and occupancy permits for built structures, and so forth. Even activities that may carry
enormous social and even environmental benefits, such as renewable energy generation facilities, cause
environmental harms to public land and wildlife. See John Copeland Nagle, Green Hanns of Green
Projects, 27 Norin DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUn. Pot'Y 59, 59-60 (2013).
266. This stewardship is perhaps most fully captured in law in the public trust doctrine. See
generally CocaINs i7 AL., supra note II, at 64-117.
267. See Blumm, supra note 233, at 407. This problem is certainly not unique to the natural-
resources context. The rest of environmental law (not to mention entirely different spheres of public
policy) is also characterized by, for example, grandfathering and other forms of transition relief in
which incumbents are treated differently than new market entrants. See Huber, supra note 25, at 91-92.
268. See, e.g., Peltzman, supra note 232, at 212; Stigler, supra note 232, at 5-6; see also DANIEl.
McCoxi., COMMAND OF THE WATERS: IRON TRIANGLES, FlDIERAL WATER DEVEiOPMENT, AND INDIAN WArER
5-11, 249-51 (1987) (describing how informal political coalitions between Congress, administrative
agencies, and interest groups-"iron triangles"-influence policy in Indian water development issues).
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resource claimant will derive simply from sustaining a claim, which in turn
makes it difficult to recover fair market value. For example, as we have seen,
federal oil and gas leasing practices make it nearly impossible to capture bonus
payments beyond the initial one; coal leasing practices make it unlikely that
lease sales will receive multiple bids; leasebacks on national parks were priced
under the assumption that the claims would terminate upon expiration.2 69 in
each case, claimants derive a benefit that, under the proprietary model, would
properly be compensable. Furthermore, even occasional grants of unwarranted
claim extension or renewal may become more broadly problematic by making
it more difficult for federal officials to deny similar treatment to similarly
situated claimants. Agencies may expose themselves to the threat of litigation
by creating the appearance of arbitrary administration. Observable patterns of
administrative behavior affect the calculus of other claimants, perhaps encourag-
ing them to gamble that they too will be allowed to exceed the parameters of
their legal entitlement.
Because these problems are rooted in part in the institutional realities of
public land management, 270 there may be unavoidable to some degree. That
said, the examples and case studies presented earlier in the Article have hinted
at steps that might alleviate some of the difficulties associated with durable
private claims. Land management agencies could enforce more strictly the
termination of expiring claims and publicize this new emphasis. Requests for
the renewal of existing claims, whether for ski resorts, forest cabins, or hydro-
power facilities, could be scrutinized more closely to confirm their ongoing
consistency with current federal law and policy. Commodity sales could be
reformed to maximize genuine competition and minimize the ability of legacy
interests to structure resource sales to their own liking.
Although the current polarization within Congress makes it unlikely that we
will see fundamental changes to resource management regimes in the near
future, 2 7 1 this Article does have an important forward-looking implication for
federal lawmakers. The analysis presented here suggests that officials should be
wary of creating new private rights in public resources, lest today's solutions
become tomorrow's problems.2 72 New classes of claims are likely to be "stickier"
than the letter of the law might suggest. There are several resource domains
269. See supra section l.B.
270. See supra section II.B.
271. See generally SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZAION IN CONGRESS (2008) (a leading political
science account of congressional polarization, maintaining that congressional polarization can be
attributed to a corresponding polarization within the parties' constituencies and the increasing power of
congressional leaders and their willingness to use certain legislative procedural maneuvers associated
with polarization). Polarization has made it exceedingly difficult to pass any broad new legislation;
there has been precious little significant legislation in the environmental sphere since the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990. See CHRISTOPHER McGRORY KLYZA & DAvID J. SOUSA, AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL
Poiicy, 1990-2006: BEYOND GRIDLOCK 285-96 (rev. ed. 2013).
272. J.B. Ruhl has articulated an analogous point with respect to "climate change winners,"
suggesting that lawmakers should take care to "ensure no property rights accrue in the future benefits of
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in which new private rights are presently being created or contemplated.
Emissions trading, for example, has been on the rise; in such programs, govern-
ments allocate to emitters the right to emit certain quantities of various pollut-
ants, who may then trade such rights amongst themselves. 273 Lawmakers
generally try to stipulate that emissions credits or allowances do not consti-
tute a property right,274 but it is far from clear that recipients see it the same
way.27 In fact, some have suggested that such programs succeed and endure
precisely because participants realize that emissions credits are valuable assets
so long as the program continues.27 ' The termination of a cap-and-trade or other
emissions trading program, or any other attempt to truncate emissions allow-
ances, would likely incur substantial opposition from allowance holders. By
contrast, alternative regulatory strategies, such as emissions taxes, do not create
a property-like entitlement.
Renewable energy production on federal lands is also increasing substan-
tially, and although environmentalists tend to support this, care should be taken
lest even these private claims outgrow their initial purposes.-77 At a minimum,
lawmakers should redouble their efforts to delimit carefully such claims or
"hardwire" limitations directly into them lest they give rise to the same difficul-
ties already apparent elsewhere in public resource management.2 78 At present,
the BLM's approach to the tenure of renewable energy claims is frustratingly
vague, in sharp contrast to other features of its policies regarding renewable
energy installations on federal lands. The BLM has articulated thorough and
climate change." J.B. Ruhi, The Political Economy of Climate Change Winners, 97 MINN. L. Riv. 206,
273 (2012).
273. See generally Bruce R. Huber, How Did RGGI Do It? Political Economy and Emissions
Auctions, 40 EcolAoiy L.Q. 59, 66-71 (2013) (providing a general background of the creation of
property-like entitlements in emissions trading programs).
274. Section 765 1(f) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, for example, made explicit that
sulfur dioxide emissions allowances in the law's Acid Rain Program are not property:
An allowance allocated under this subchapter is a limited authorization to emit sulfur
dioxide.... Such allowance does not constitute a property right. Nothing in this subchapter
or in any other provision of law shall be construed to limit the authority of the United States to
terminate or limit such authorization.
42 U.S.C. § 765 1b(f) (2012).
275. See Daniel H. Cole, Clearing the Air: Four Propositions About Property Rights and Environunen-
ral Protection, 10 DUKli ENVTI.. L. & Po['v. F. 103. 113-14 (1999).
276. See ERIC M. PATASHNIK, RioRMS AT RIsK: WHAT HAPPENs AinR MAJOR PoIcy CHANGIts ARE
ENAcrin 136-54 (2008).
277. See John D. Leshy, Federal Lands in the Tventv-First Century, 50 NAr. RiesouRcI:s J. 111. 119
(2010). The former Solicitor for the Department of the Interior here suggests that the government
-experiment with different tenure provisions" when authorizing renewable energy development on
federal lands, such as auctioning sites in "fee simple conditional with a reverter back into public
ownership once the use ends and the land is reclaimed." Id. at 121.
278. One approach would be a reverter upon cessation of the stated use. See id. Alternatively,
agencies could grant nonrenewable fixed-length terms of sufficient duration to allow a return on capital.
or create a default presumption in favor of nonrenewal. which could be overcome only upon individual-
ized review.
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stringent policies with respect to, among other things, diligent development,27 9
performance and reclamation bonding,28 o and environmental review.28' But
with respect to the tenure of renewable energy claimants, the BLM has simply
said that it will issue rights-of-way for a term of thirty years, 2 and that it "has
the discretion to renew the grant if doing so is in the public interest."2 83
CONCLUSION
The rules of property law shape resource use in various ways. The patterns
and pathologies that have attended the development of private property, in
particular, have been studied closely and carefully. Scholars have brought to
light aspects of American property law that have hastened the destruction of
private wilderness, 284 brought about American dependence on foreign oil,285
and even helped guarantee that hydraulic fracturing ("fracking") would happen
here, first.2 86 But in a country in which nearly one-third of the land is owned by
government, law's relation to resource use cannot be fully understood without
examining the rules and institutions that deal with public property. Public
property is a fundamentally different beast than private property, for decisions
about its use are made by governmental entities whose actions derive from
different premises than private property owners. Although the federal public
lands are often thought of as enclaves of conservation and land protection,
they have historically been made available for a wide array of uses by its
citizens. Generous terms of access have given rise to a vast number of private
claims on these lands. The durability of these claims is a defining characteristic
of public property, and one that has important implications for its management,
for areas of policy that are shaped by public land management, and for
theoretical inquiries into the nature of public property.
279. See Instruction Memorandum No. 2011-003 from Robert V. Abbey, Dir., Bureau of Land




281. See Instruction Memorandum No. 2011-059 from Robert V. Abbey, Dir., Bureau of Land
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283. 43 C.F.R. § 2807.22. This is the standard renewal provision for all rights-of-way on the BLM's
land, and is made applicable to renewal energy installations by the Bureau's Solar Energy Development
Policy. Instruction Memorandum No. 2011-003, supra note 279.
284. See John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. Cu. L. Riv.
519, 520 (1996).
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INIus-TRY 9-13 (2010).
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